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INNOVATIONS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: 
NUM1vii- DRIVEN TO EXCELLENCE 
Marley S. Weiss* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
NUMMI, New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc., has surely 
accomplished one of the most remarkable transformations in the annals 
of U.S. manufacturing.1 In 1982, General Motors Corp. ("GM") closed 
its twenty year old automobile production plant in Fremont, California. 
This plant was renowned for the militancy of its unionized workforce, 
represented by Local 1364 of the International Union, United Automo-
bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America 
("UAW''). The Fremont operations were characterized by extreme 
hostility between labor and management, low productivity levels, and 
* Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, 
1974; B.A., Barnard College, 1971. 
1. For factual material, this article relies heavily upon the presentations of Martha Quesada, 
NUMMI employee and active, rank and file member ofUAW Local2244, and its predecessor when 
General Motors operated the plant, UA W Local 1364; Elisa Martinez, NUMMI labor relations 
representative; and Jim Burch, NUMMI Manager for Government Affairs, and former Manager, 
Human Resources, at the Canada-Mexico-U.S. Workshops on Labor Law and Practice, Workshop 
No. 3, "Innovations in Collective Bargaining," June 29, 1994, La Jolla, California, U.S.A. 
(unpaginated transcript on file with the United States Department of Labor, Office of the American 
Workplace) [hereinafter respectively Quesada Presentation, Martinez Presentation, and Burch 
Presentation]. It also draws extensively upon the text of the AGREEMENT BETWEEN NEW UNITED 
MOTOR MANUFACTURlNG, INc. AND UAW (July 1, 1991) (a copy of this agreement is on file with 
the author) [hereinafter NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT]. This contract was in effect for the period of 
July I, 1991 through July 31, 1994. A new agreement was ratified on August 10, 1994. See 
NUMMI Workers Approve New Four Year Contract, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at All (Aug. 
16, 1994). References in this paper are to the 1991-1994 agreement in effect at the time of the tri-
national, LaJolla workshop. 
Ms. Martinez' presentation was largely based upon the NUMMI 1993 Speaker's Bureau 
Slideshow Script (unpublished document, copy on file with the author) [hereinafter NUMMI Script]. 
In addition, the author conducted lengthy preparatory interviews in LaJolla with both Ms. Martinez 
and Ms. Quesada on June 29, 1994. Where information is derived from the author's notes of those 
interviews, rather than the formal workshop presentations, it is so indicated. 
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high defect rates in their products? 
In 1983, Toyota and GM formed a joint venture, NUMMI, to 
produce Toyota-designed small cars, under Toyota management, at the 
shuttered plant. Using a workforce composed primarily of former GM 
Fremont plant employees, by 1986, NUMMI was matching the productiv-
ity and quality standards set in Toyota's Japanese plants.3 Absenteeism 
has remained a consistently low three percent.4 NUMMI is now the 
only automobile manufacturing plant remaining in operation in Califor-
nia.5 
NUMMI succeeded despite the absence of certain factors often 
considered to be advantageous to other Japanese automobile industry 
transplant facilities. The plant was not originally designed to function 
with Japanese production methods; the workforce was not handpicked for 
its adaptability to team manufacturing and company goals; and the 
NUMMI workforce is not predominantly composed of young workers, 
untainted by prior exposure to traditional U.S. manufacturing systems, 
and lacking strong commitment to unionization. 
On the contrary, NUMMI started with a workforce typical of older, 
existing Big Three automobile manufacturing plants. Some eighty-five 
percent of initial hires were prior GM Fremont plant workers. Most were 
UAW members. Many were over age forty, with attendant higher 
pension and. insurance benefit costs.6 The workforce was at least as 
diverse on the basis of race and sex as a typical GM plant, 7 and 
considerably more so than most of the new, Japanese automobile 
transplant facilities. 8 Moreover, NUMMI recognized and bargained 
2. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 1; Paul S. Adler, 
Time-and-Motion Regained, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 97, 97-98; Lowell Turner, 
Industrial Relations and the Reorganization of Work in West Germany: Lessons for the U.S., in 
UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 217,232 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds,, 1992). 
3. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 2, at 99; Turner, supra note 2, at 233-34, 246 nn.30-31; Ray 
Marshall, Work Organization, Unions and Economic Performance, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC 
COMPETITIVENESS 287, 303 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992). Productivity at the 
plant is 50% higher than it was under GM control, and 40% higher than the average in traditional 
GM plants. !d. NUMMI "doubled productivity in a nine month period." Donna Brown, Why 
Participqtive Management Won't Work Here, 81 MGMT. REv. 42 (June 1992). 
4. PaulS. Adler & Robert E. Cole, Designed for Learning: A Tale of Two Auto Plants, 34 
SLOAN MGMT. REv. 85, 87 (Spring 1993). 
5. Gary S. Vasilash, NUMMI: Proving that Cars Can Be Built in California, 104 PRODUCTION 
36, 37 (Feb. 1992). 
6. Adler, supra note 2, at 99; see also Turner, supra note 2, at 233, 246 n.30 (setting the 
figure at 80% rather than 85%). 
7. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
8. Adler, supra note 2, at 99. 
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collectively with the UAW from its inception; this plant has never been 
a non-union operation.9 
None of the usual American excuses for weak production apply, 
when confronted with the success of the NUMMI management system 
at the Fremont plant. The combination of lean manufacturing methods, 
familial organizational philosophy, worker participation, and cooperative 
labor-management relations has consistently yielded award-winning 
vehicles, and has become a model for American industry. In 1994, for 
example, the Geo Prizm that the plant builds for Chevrolet was rated by 
J.D. Power & Associates as the fourth best built car in the industry, only 
following behind three Lexus models. 10 
Nevertheless, creating and maintaining a mutually acceptable, 
cooperative labor-management environment has entailed sustained efforts 
on all sides. The plant's future, while bright, is not entirely secure. 
This article will examine the NUMMI system in greater detail, 
focusing particularly upon the organization of work and the workforce, 
key aspects oflabor-management relations, and the role played by worker 
participation. It will then situate the NUMMI approach in the context of 
other models of lean manufacturing and worker participation. Finally, 
it will address legal questions pertaining to the NUMMI model of 
collective bargaining and union representation, and will consider the need 
for labor law reform in the U.S. if such a model is to be encouraged. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
GM opened the Fremont, California assembly plant in 1962, 
eventually employing about 7,000 UAW members to build about 300,000 
cars and trucks per year. By 1982, when it closed the plant, bargaining 
unit employment had fallen to about 5,000, absenteeism was running 
about twenty percent, and labor-management relations at the plant were 
plagued by wildcat strikes, low productivity, and other blatant manifesta-
9. Marshall, supra note 3, at 302. This is particularly unusual since Japanese-owned factories 
in the United States are largely non-union. See Japanese-owned Companies in United States Tend 
To Mimic Non-union U.S. Firms, Study Finds, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at A-5 (Feb. 27, 
1992). While several other Japanese joint ventures with Big Three automakers have followed 
NUMMI's lead and recognized the American or Canadian Auto Workers union when they have 
taken over existing plant facilities, no Japanese automobile manufacturer has yet permitted 
unionization at any greenfield site. See Ernest J. Yanarella & William C. Green, The UAW and 
CAW Confront Lean Production at Saturn, CAM/, and the Japanese Automobile Transplants, 18 
LAB. STUD. J. 52, 57, 60 nn23-24, 70-72 (Jan. 1994). 
10. Martinez Presentation, supra note 1. 
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tions of mutual hostility. 11 Hundreds of grievances remained unresolved 
at the time of the closing.12 GM was, however, in the process of 
recentralizing its production in the midwestern United States, and closing 
many plants to reduce overall production capacity. 13 The closure 
decision, therefore, cannot be blamed squarely on adversarial labor· 
management relations. 
In late 1982, GM and Toyota entered into negotiations, and in 1983, 
reached an agreement in principle to establish the joint venture subse· 
quently named NU1v1MI. The joint venture was to be an independent 
company, using production concepts and techniques similar to those 
employed by Toyota in its Japanese facilities. GM wanted to obtain 
direct experience with the highly-acclaimed Toyota production system, 
as well as a high quality subcompact automobile to be sold under its 
Chevrolet label. Toyota wanted to explore the feasibility of using its 
Japanese produ.ction methods with American workers and suppliers.14 
The Japanese automaker also hoped to reduce the protectionist political 
pressures generated by large volume imports of Japanese-made automo-
biles.15 
Initially, Toyota sought to operate the plant on a non-union basis. 16 
However, as a result of pressure placed upon GM from the UAW, 
Toyota was ultimately persuaded to enter into a letter of intent with the 
union. 17 
Toyota agreed to fill a majority of the initial employee complement 
from among the 5,000 laid-off GM Fremont employees, to recognize 
their union, the UAW, as the collective bargaining agent for the plant, 
and to pay prevailing U.S. auto industry wages and benefits. In return, 
11. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Adler, supra note 2, at 98. Adler claims employment 
had fallen to 3,000 at closure. Adler, supra note 2, at 98. Quesada, who then was working in the 
plant as a GM employee, estimated that about 5,000 employees remained on the active payroll 
shortly before closure. Approximately the same number of employees retained layoff status when 
the plant closed, ensuring that if the plant were to reopen under GM auspices, they would be entitled 
to recall to employment in order of seniority. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
12. Adler, supra note 2, at 99. 
13. See, e.g., Maryann Keller, Labor Unrest at GM, 175 AUTOMOTIVE INDUS. 13 (May 1995). 
14. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 1-2; Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr., Alliances Speed Knowledge 
Transfor, 19 PLAN. REv. 10, 12 (1991). 
15. See Badaracco, supra note 14, at 12; Martin Kenney & Richard Florida, How Japanese 
Industry Is Rebuilding the Rust Belt, 94 TECH. REV. 24, 27 (Feb. 1991); Edward K. Miller & Drew 
Winter, The "Other Big 3" Are Becoming All-American, 27 WARDS AUTO WORLD 24, 37 (Feb. 
1991). 
16. Adler, supra note 2, at 98; Lindsay Chappell, Labor Rules Are Models for Partners, 
Transplants, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Oct. 19, 1992, at 39. 
17. Adler, supra note 2, at 98-99. 
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the UAW agreed to accept the Toyota production system, based upon 
team concepts and broad job classifications.18 In addition, the union 
agreed to "a non-adversarial relationship built on mutual trust, respect, 
and cooperation." The company and union operated under this letter of 
understanding for twenty-two months, before entering into a formal 
collective bargaining agreement.19 
After several months of factory renovation, NU.T\IfMI commenced 
hiring workers and reopened the Fremont facility in 1984.20 NUMiv1I 
sent application forms to al15,000 laid offFremont plant bargaining unit 
employees. The application materials advised the employees that 
NUMMI would not be bound by the collective bargaining agreement 
formerly in effect between GM and the UAW at the Fremont facility. 
The materials also informed prospective applicants that unlike its 
predecessor employer, NUMivii would not tolerate such poor employ-
ment practices as high absenteeism and low quality. The company 
received back about 3,000 completed applications from the former GM 
employees.21 After screening out those it evaluated as unacceptable, 
NUMiv1I hired a majority of the remaining applicants.22 
Originally, the plant exclusively made subcompact cars for GM and 
Toyota. However, in 1991, the facility was expanded to add a compact 
truck line for Toyota.23 
As of this writing, NUMivii employs about 4,300 workers, including 
3,500 bargaining unit employees, working on two shifts, and is in the 
process of further expansion. The plant presently makes the Geo Prizm 
for Chevrolet and the Toyota Corolla Sedan and Toyota compact pickup 
trucks for Toyota. It has the capacity to manufacture about 220,000 cars 
and 125,000 trucks per year.24 This compares quite favorably with 
GM's previous production of some 300,000 vehicles per year using 6,000 
18. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 3; Adler, supra note 2, at 99. 
19. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 3. 
20. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 3-4; Adler, supra note 2, at 99. 
21. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 4. 
22. See Turner, supra note 2, at 246 n.30 (stating that of the 3,300 applications received, 
NUMMI hired approximately 2,000 out of an initial workforce of 2,500); see also Adler, supra note 
2, at 99 (stating that about 85% of approximately 2,200 initially hired hourly employees at NUMMI 
were former GM Fremont plant workers). Despite the screening, "in the end, most workers from 
the old plant who wanted jobs at NUMMI were hired, including former union activists." Turner, 
supra note 2, at 233; accord Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
23. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 10-11; see also Thomas F. Black, Things "Pick Up" at 
NUMM/, 21 WARD'S AUTO WORLD 41 (Feb. 1991); Vasilash, supra note·s, at 37. 
24. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
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employees.25 
NUMMI has a separate corporate identity, with a Board of Directors 
composed of equal numbers of GM and Toyota representatives. GM is 
charged with marketing and financial responsibility. Toyota is responsi-
ble for the day to day management of the enterprise.26 
At its inception, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") was 
reluctant to approve the joint venture because of the size and market 
share of the two participants.27 It did so, nevertheless, but restricted the 
life of the joint venture to twelve years, and imposed further restraints 
upon the sharing of information between GM and Toyota.28 In 1993, 
however, GM and Toyota successfully petitioned the FTC to eliminate 
the time limit, on grounds of the vast competitive changes within the 
automobile industry.29 NUMMI is now free to continue operations as 
long as its two corporate parents so desire. 
Prior to the decision to continue operations in the joint venture 
format, it was widely speculated, among workers in the plant as well as 
among outsiders, that Toyota would buy the facility from GM.30 GM, 
after all, has been reducing an enormous amount of excess capacity, 
while Toyota has been trying to expand its limited, fully-exhausted 
production capacity in North America.31 
One important factor cited by Toyota management in deciding to 
retain the joint venture format was the fear of more adversarial labor-
management relations. While at present, it enjoys excellent relations 
with both the UAW local union and the international union, Toyota 
recognizes that the UAW is a democratic organization. Toyota has 
repeatedly expressed concern that at some future point, more militant 
25. See Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
26. Martinez Presentation, supra note 1; Vasilash, supra note 5, at 38. 
27. Martinez Presentation, supra note 1; Lindsay Chappell, It's NUMMI Forever, or NUMMI 
No More; Plant's Fate Awaits FTC Decision, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, July 5, 1993, at 16. Chrysler 
Corp. and Ford Motor Corp., fearing the competition, strongly objected to the joint venture which 
was originally scheduled to cease in December, 1996. /d. 
28. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 2; Chappell, supra note 27, at 16; Vasilash, supra note 
5, at 38. 
29. Martinez Presentation, supra note 1; Lindsay Chappell, Toyota Seeks NUMMI Boost; Wants 
To Double Output, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Nov. 8, 1993, at 1. 
30. See, e.g., Chappell, supra note 27, at 16; Black, supra note 23, at 41; Vasilash, supra note 
, 5, at 38. Vasilash notes that "according to a consensus of several industry observers, ••• the plant 
going to Toyota seems to be the [possibility] to bet on." Vasilash, supra note 5, at 38. But see 
Profitability Is Now Toyota's Main Focus, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Nov. 30, 1992, at 26 (quoting 
President Tatsuro Toyoda of Toyota Motor Corp., previously the founding president ofNUMMI, as 
saying that the NUMMI joint venture partnership "should continue, as is."). 
31. See, e.g., Chappell, supra note 27, at 16. 
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leadership might ascend to power within the union and pursue a less 
cooperative course. 32 
Nevertheless, Toyota has made several decisions to expand plant 
capacity and production operations, and is in the process of another 
expansion of truck production. However, as a condition of committing 
capital to expansion, NUM:MI extracted from the union a major 
concession on workers' schedules, which the union rank and file plainly 
would not have accepted otherwise. 33 The limit, then, for the union and 
the workers, of the relationship of trust and cooperation, is the 
employer's implicit threat of withdrawal of capital or refusal to commit 
further investment.34 
For the first several years after the plant opened, the elected local 
union administration was highly supportive of the NUM:MI lean 
production process, worker participation, and cooperative labor-manage-
ment relations.35 However, there have been a series of elections in 
which representatives of an opposition faction, the People's Caucus, has 
won seats on the bargaining committee, which negotiates and administers 
the collective bargaining agreement. Insurgent candidates have also won 
elected office within the administrative governance structure of the local 
32. Cf. Turner, supra note 2, at 235 (stating that NUMMI's "management clearly aimed for and 
would be more comfortable with a tamer enterprise union.''); see also Turner, supra note 2, at 240 
(discussing the notion that one path to successful work reorganization into the lean production 
system is through ''the integration of subordinate local unions into managerial processes.''). Turner 
added that "[t]he Japanese model, which poses current dangers for unions in the U.S., is probably 
the model that NUMMI management had in mind until union politics intervened.'' Turner, supra 
note 2, at 240. The dissident wing of the UA W, New Directions, has opposed the trend towards 
labor-management cooperation and urges the UAW to return to a more adversarial stance. See, e.g., 
Robert R. Rehder, Japanese Transplants After the Honeymoon, 33 Bus. HORIZONS 87, 88 (Jan. 
1990); Bob Filipczak, Unions in the '90s: Cooperation or Capitulation?, 30 TRAINING 25,25-26, 
30 (May 1993). The anti-lean production/team-based participation view is most fully articulated in 
MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND THE TEAM CONCEPT {1988). 
33. Interview with Martha Quesada, NUMMI employee and UA W Local 2244 activist, in 
LaJolla, Cal. (June 29, 1994). The 1994 expansion is only the most recent in which NUMMI has 
extracted a quid pro quo. NUMMI has displayed a pattern of demanding union concessions on work 
schedules and break times as a condition of new investment and expansion of production at the 
Fremont facility. Management attempted to extract concessions from the union regarding break-time 
as a condition of its 1991 expansion, adding compact truck production. See Black, supra note 23, 
at 41. In 1993, expansion plans were canceled when Local 2244 membership refused to ratify a 
contract amendment permitting a three crew, 10 hour per day work schedule for certain operations. 
Lindsay Chappell, NUMMI Cancels Expansion, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, June 28, 1993, at 1. When the 
members reversed themselves in a second ratification vote, expansion plans were reinstated. Lindsay 
Chappell, NUMMI Revives Expansion, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, July 12, 1993, at 1; UAW Agrees to 
Contract Modifications at NUMMI, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 131, at diS (July 12, 1993). 
34. See Quesada Presentation, supra note l. 
35. Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33. 
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union. The opposition faction seeks a return to more traditional, 
adversarial representation, particularly on the shop floor. So far, 
however, political control of both the bargaining committee and the local 
union executive board has remained in the hands of leaders favoring 
continuation of the NUMMI-style cooperation and participation 
processes.36 
At the international union level, for the past ten or fifteen years, 
there has been consistent, high level support for innovative, cooperative 
approaches to labor-management relations and worker participation. 
Nevertheless, the UAW has been deeply divided about how far and how 
fast to proceed in this direction.37 Now that Owen Beiber has retired 
and Stephen T. Yokich has assumed the office of president of the 
international union, it is probable that the UAW will take a stronger 
position against what some would regard as erosion of the traditional 
union arms-length relationship with the employer. The international 
union may well view experimental, cooperative relations more cautious-
ly.38 NUMMI's concerns about a change in union direction are not 
36. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33; Turner, 
supra note 2, at 234-35; see also GM, Toyota Joint Venture Provides Model of Labor-Management 
Cooperation, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 233, at d20 (Dec. 7, 1993) [hereinafter Joint 
Venture]. Local union president Charles Curry, elected on the People's Caucus slate in 1991, 
switched one year later to the Administration Caucus. 
37. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33. See 
generally Harry Katz & John Paul MacDuffie, Collective Bargaining in the U.S. Auto Assembly 
Sector, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECllVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 181, 210-11, 213 
(Paula B. Voos ed., 1994). 
38. The mixed reactions to, and even withdrawal from some key aspects of the UA W's most 
extensive experiment in labor-management cooperation and worker participation, with OM's Saturn 
subsidiary, is illustrative. Shift-Rotation Vote Scheduled at General Motors Saturn Plant, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 167, at dl1 (Aug. 31, 1994); see Saturn Workers Vote to Reconsider Nontradition-
al, Rotating Work Schedule, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at d9 (Sept. 9, 1994). The local union 
president, Mike Bennett, has complained that then international vice president responsible for Saturn 
and GM operations, Stephen P. Yokich, is "too slow to relinquish traditional union concepts like 
seniority." /d. Yokich has intervened at Saturn in response to member complaints that the rotating 
shift schedule, favored by Bennett, disrnpts family relationships and poses health hazards to 
employees. Y okich has also pressured both Saturn and the local leadership to permit Saturn 
employees to write traditional formal grievances over routine shop floor disputes, in response to 
persistent member complaints of serious shop floor problems. See UAW Leaders Agree Saturn Must 
Expand, Despite Problems with Current Contract, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at d11 (Jan. 13, 
1994). The rotating schedule has deeply divided the local's membership, producing a series of 
contradictory membership votes. See Saturn Workers Vote to Reconsider Nontraditional, Rotating 
Work Schedule, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at d9 (Sept. 9, 1994) (initial, pre-contract 
negotiations advisory referendum favors ending rotating shifts); Saturn Workers Again Reject 
Agreement, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 232, at dl9 (Dec. 6, 1994) (two ratification votes rejecting 
proposed contract); Auto Industry: Saturn Corp. Says Its Workers Approve Modifications to Contract, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at d10 (Jan. 17, 1995) (approving contract with renegotiated terms); 
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wholly without foundation. 
Until now, there has been widespread acceptance on the part of both 
labor and management at NUivlMI, that the collective bargaining process 
itself is the main forum in which to resolve major topics upon which the 
parties' interests diverge, and that adversarialism in the service of the 
parties' respective interests need not poison the prevailing cooperative 
atmosphere.39 In August of 1994, however, collective bargaining for a 
new agreement resulted in the first serious strike threat, albeit one that 
was narrowly averted when the parties reached a new agreement shortly 
after the strike deadline.40 
III. THE NUiv1MI MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY AND PRODUCTION 
SYSTEM 
Under the terms of the joint venture, Toyota has control over 
manufacturing operations. Both joint venture partners contemplated from 
the outset that Toyota's operations in Japan would be the model for 
NUMMI,41 with the sole significant exception being the difference 
between recognizing and bargaining with an American labor union as 
opposed to a Japanese one.42 
NUMMI adopted from Toyota its primary mission statement and its 
four supporting philosophical policies. The fundamental goal is "to build 
products with quality as high as anywhere in the world while ensuring 
that costs are the most competitive of any manufacturer."43 Shorter 
term goals are adopted annually.44 The team concept is the central 
means of accomplishing NUivlMI's goals,45 and it permeates the 
company's organizational structures as well as all of NUMMI's 
functional processes. 
see also UAW Workers Permitted To Apply for Jobs in Traditional GM Plants, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 205, at dl4 (Oct. 26, 1994) (in yet further departures from the original concept, Saturn 
employees have the opportunity to transfer back to GM plants, and Saturn workers have decided to 
eliminate certain participatory meetings to use the extra time to increase car production). 
39. Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33. 
40. See UA\V, NUMMI Agree on New Pact, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 148, at d18 (Aug. 4, 
1994); NUMMI Workers Approve New Four-Year Contract, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at dl4 
(Aug. 16, 1994). 
41. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
42. In the end, however, the plant adapted the Japanese model to more individualistic American 
values. See, e.g., Joint Venture, supra note 36, at d20. 
43. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 4; Burch Presentation, supra note I. 
44. NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 5. 
45. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 5, 9. 
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NU1\.1MI has also embraced Toyota's four philosophical policies to 
support this central mission: 
(1) foster a stable and cooperative relationship between all team 
members, particularly between labor and management; 
(2) implement the philosophy that "quality should be assured in the 
production process itself;" 
(3) establish long-term and stable relationships with qualified 
suppliers; and 
( 4) maintain a cooperative, friendly relationship in the community and 
maintain a company image of being a fair employer and neigh-
bor.46 
NU1\.1MI, like Toyota, has designed its production system around 
four central concepts to achieve its twin objectives of highest quality and 
lowest cost: (1) just-in-time production; (2) ''jidoka," designing quality 
into the production process itself;47 (3) team-based organization of the 
workforce and of production, coupled with a philosophical commitment 
to full utilization of team members' abilities; and (4) "kaizen," or 
continuous improvement of the manufacturing process.48 These 
concepts should be thought of as interrelated, integrated, and mutually 
reinforcing, rather than independent.49 Together, the process is intended 
to ensure that no defects are passed on or overlooked. Instead, all are to 
be caught and rectified at the earliest possible point, where the causation 
of the problem can be traced and corrected before further defective parts 
are produced.50 This process also makes workers far more readily 
accountable for their errors or omissions than they would be under more 
conventional American manufacturing systems.51 
46. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 5. 
47. Jidoka is often equated with Total Quality Management or Total Quality Control in 
American terminology. See, e.g., S. Mark Young, A Framework for Successful Adoption and 
Performance of Japanese Manufacturing Practices in the United States, 17 ACAD. OF MOMT. REV. 
677, 683 (1992). 
48. NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 6. 
49. See NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 6. 
50. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 6. 
51. Young, supra note 47, at 683. For a more detailed description ofNUMMI's organizational 
philosophy, manufacturing systems, and labor relations, see Adler, supra note 2, at 97-98; Clair 
Brown & Michael Reich, When Does Union-Management Cooperation Work? A Look at NUMMI 
and GM-Van Nuys, 31 CAL. MGMT. REV. 26,28 (Summer 1989). 
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1. Just-in-Time Production 
Just-in-time production is production in which the customer order 
"pulls" the product through the manufacturing process, with as little 
inventory kept on hand as possible. The materials and parts must arrive 
''just-in-time" at the appropriate production station where they are 
processed, assembled, or otherwise integrated into the product. This 
method keeps costs of parts and materials, as well as storage space 
requirements, to a minimum. 52 It is essential, however, that materials 
arrive on time, or costly delays will result. The workforce is likewise 
organized with few utility workers, reserves, or other buffers. While 
extremely efficient, this method is also highly vulnerable to disruption in 
the event of a labor dispute. From management's point of view, a 
successful operation is highly dependent on stable, harmonious labor-
management relations.53 
At NUMMI, Toyota "kanban" or computer card technology is relied 
upon to ensure timely arrival of appropriate parts and materials at the 
correct sites. The kanban cards determine the flow of parts and material 
throughout the facility, control volume and prevent overproduction. The 
cards also provide guidance and instruction to the teams of workers 
regarding new methods of production. 54 The kanban system thus 
controls the pace of production and worker slack time. 55 
2. "Jidoka" or Total Quality 
Jidoka is the philosophy underlying and binding together the 
manufacturing method. The central idea is that quality should be 
designed into the production process itself, that the process should be 
arranged so as to ensure quality. This is primarily accomplished through 
designing the product for manufacturability, engineering the manufactur-
ing process to ensure quality, including some production equipment that 
can sense malfunctions or product defects, and organizing the work of 
52. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 6. This is the reverse of the traditional U.S. "push"-based 
manufacturing process, in which workers push the completed sub-assembly through for further manu-
facturing, followed by the eventual final ''push" by marketing and sales to dispose of the product 
via consumer purchase. 
53. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 692; John Humphrey, Japanese Production Management 
and Labour Relations in Brazil, 30 J. DEV. STUD. 92, 96-97 (1993). 
54. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 6. 
55. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 686. 
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the workers making components, subassemblies and the final product 
itself to facilitate and, indeed, require, attention to quality maximization 
and elimination of waste. Where team members identify defects, they 
are to correct them, if possible, or else pull the Andon cord and stop the 
line. 56 
3. The Team Concept 
The team concept and the goal of full utilization of team members' 
abilities constitute the human resources philosophy upon which 
NUM:MI's organization is premised.57 Workers are organized into 
teams of about five workers each, headed by a team leader. Each team 
is responsible for a set of jobs; a piece of the production process. For 
example, one team might assemble the chassis of the car, the next might 
align it, the third would add the cab, the fourth would add the deck, and 
so on.58 
All team positions, including that of team leader, are in the UAW-
represented collective bargaining unit. The team leader is roughly 
equivalent to "leaders" in many traditional industrial plants, and is paid 
an additional sixty cents per hour to coordinate the team's functions.59 
When NUM:MI first reopened the plant, management selected the team 
leaders. After several disputes over the fairness of the selection process, 
however, the company agreed to the creation of a joint union-manage-
ment committee, which selects leaders on the basis of a set of collective-
ly-bargained, objective criteria.60 
Several teams together form a group, under the direction of a group 
leader. The group leader is the front-line supervisor or foreman in 
ordinary parlance, but is supposed to exercise authority in a much more 
flexible and supportive manner than the traditional, authoritarian 
supervisor. Managers, engineers, and other support staff also work 
56. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 7; see also NUMMI-UA W AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at 
art. XIV,§ 1; art. XXVIII,§ 1.2. See generally Young, supra note 47, at 683. 
57. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 5, 7, 9. 
58. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, 
at art. XIV, § l. 
59. See NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XIV, § 1.2; art. XVII, § 2. 
60. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 87, 90; see also 
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XVI; Letter of Understanding from Thomas King, 
Jr., NUMMI Manager, Labor Relations, to George Nano, UA W Local 2244 Bargaining Committee 
Chairman (July 1, 1991), 1"1111, 5 (on file with author). 
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closely with each team, as problems arise.61 
In all matters, the team is intended to function as the primary 
problem-solving structure. The team draws upon the expertise, advice, 
counsel, and assistance of the managers and technical experts in a 
manner less like hierarchical authority and more closely approximating 
athletic coaching.62 "An integral part of the management style is a 
decision-making process based on consensus by all areas affected by the 
decision to be made," according to the company.63 The NUMMI view 
is that those who work with the problem, best understand it, and can 
contribute the widest possible array of potential solutions for consider-
ation in the decisionmaking process. 64 
Both the groups of teams, and the company's workforce as a whole 
are regarded as larger teams. At each level, teams are expected to pull 
together for the common good, the corporate objectives of highest quality 
and lowest costs.65 
At its start-up, NUM:MI re-hired none of the laid-off GM supervi-
sors.66 This eliminated the risk of supervisory resistance to a manage-
ment style which pushes authority down to the rank and file worker, 
disempowering controlling-style supervision.67 The managerial hierar-
chy has been flattened from eight managerial levels under GM to five 
under NUM:MI.68 There are no industrial engineers because those job 
functions have effectively been transferred to the production teams.69 
61. Adler, supra note 2, at 104; see a~o NUMMI-UA W AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XV, 
§ 1.2; art. XXIX, § 1. For another description of the plant hierarchy, see Adler & Cole, supra note 
4, at 86. 
62. See Burch Presentation, supra note I; NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 5, 7, 9; Gary S. 
Vasilash, Reengineering: Your Job May Depend on It, PRODUCTION, June 1993, at 10. 
63. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 5. 
64. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
65. NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 9. 
66. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
67. Many commentators view such resistance as a key obstacle to successful implementation 
of worker participation-based forms oflean production. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 691-92; 
see also Humphrey, supra note 53, at 107 (detailing the Brazilian experience). 
68. See William A. Nowlin, Restructuring In Manufacturing Management, Work and Labor 
Relations, 32 INDUS. MGMT. 5, 5-6 (Nov.-Dec. 1990). NUMMI reduced GM's two dozen salaried 
managerial classifications to five: president, vice president, general manager, manager, and group 
leader. Id. 
69. Burch Presentation, supra note I; Robin Y. Bergstrom, NUMMI: Engineering the Process, 
105 PRODUCTION 58, 58-59 (June 1993). For the pertinent collective bargaining agreement provi-
sions, see NUMMI-UA W AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XIV, § 1.1. Team members share 
responsibility for participating in quality/productivity improvement programs, such as quality circles 
and Kaizen. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XXVIII, §§ 1.1, 1.2 (establishing and 
revising "standardized work."). This also is discussed in Appendix C of the Agreement. See 
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Employees usually rotate positions within their teams, typically 
about three times a day, although the teams have the option of limiting 
or eliminating job rotation.70 Team members are extensively cross-
trained to facilitate both shared problem-solving and job rotation.71 
Nevertheless, teamwork does not eliminate the routine, repetitive 
nature of automobile production tasks. On the contrary, as Toyota 
boasts, the company's manufacturing methods are Taylorism to the 
maximum. 72 Kaizen is the final leg of the four production system 
concepts upon which the NUMMI method rests. Kaizen ensures that the 
actual manufacturing work performed by the teams is not variable or 
creative in the slightest, but rather is wholly dictated by set patterns that 
are to be followed unless a defect or production problem is diagnosed. 
4. Kaizen, or Continuous Improvement 
The philosophy of kaizen is that the workers should strive forever 
to improve the processes under which they work.73 While Americans 
have historically favored major innovations, the Japanese manufacturers 
have customarily relied most upon frequent, small, incremental improve-
ments to steadily improve upon previous methods.74 Kaizen at NUMMI 
is an integral part of the team process, based upon empowerment of rank 
and file workers to develop such incremental improvements in production 
processes, and indeed, imposing upon the teams the obligation to do so 
as part of their job responsibilities.75 
The time and motion entailed in each piece of the manufacturing 
process is broken down and analyzed, and reexamined as finely as 
possible, to isolate opportunities for improvement in speed, quantity, or 
method. Instead of industrial engineers standing over workers with stop 
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at app. C.; see also Vasilash, supra note 62, at 9, lO 
(describing how NUMMI teams developed the production process for building the new I993 model 
cars). 
70. Burch Presentation, supra note I; Martinez Presentation, supra note I; Quesada 
Presentation, supra note I; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. XIV,§ 1.1. 
71. Burch Presentation, supra note I; Quesada Presentation, supra note I; Bergstrom, supra 
note 69, at 60-61. 
72. See Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 86. "[T]he resulting job designs are very Tayloristic 
in their narrow scope and gesture-by-gesture regimentation." Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 86. 
73. See NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 8. 
74. See, e.g., Michele K. Bolton, Imitation Versus Innovation: Lessons To Be Learned from 
the Japanese, 2I ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 30, 38-42 {Winter 1993). 
75. Burch Presentation, supra note I; NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 5, 7-9; see also 
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. II,§ 1.6; art. XIV,§ 1.1; art. XXVlii, § I.2; app. 
c. 
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watches, however, at NU1v11vli the teams do tbis essential work them-
selves, with back-up technical and professional support available upon 
their request. Because the employees know their jobs in a thorough and 
detailed way, they are able to constantly devise small refinements which 
accumulate into large improvements in productivity and quality.76 
There is one team on each of the two sbifts performing a particular 
operation, and the standardized routine for the job is set by consensus 
between the two teams. Team meetings are regularly held for that 
purpose, as well as to address incipient problems.77 When two teams 
devise divergent standardization routines, often because of physical 
differences between the members of each team, a "standardized work 
committee" takes into consideration all ergonomic matters and attempts 
to reach an optimal solution.78 
Because the employees themselves determine the details of the 
process, they internalize and accept the changes in a way that seldom 
occurs when industrial engineers and management impose production 
modifications from above.79 Moreover, the opportunity to perform such 
intellectual tasks provides relief from pure production activities.80 
Nevertheless, at NU:tvllvli, the production work itself remains 
routinized and repetitive. In fact, "standardized work" is considerably 
more fully specified, in every detail of motion and timing, than the 
typical assembly line process. Cycle time averages about sixty seconds. 
Determination and specification of the optimal motions for every step of 
the process, and rigid adherence thereto by the teams, is intended to 
eliminate waste of motion, ensure employee safety, and maximize quality 
and efficiency.81 As NU1v11vli describes it: "by definition, standardized 
work is work done at the bighest efficiency when all tasks at the 
worksite are organized into a perfect sequence where all waste can be 
eliminated."82 Standardization also ensures that when the first sbift 
ends and the second begins, with a car or subassembly only partially 
completed, the completion of the product will tum out exactly the same 
76. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Bergstrom, supra 
note 69, at 58-59. 
77. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
78. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, 
at art. XIV,§ 1.1; art. XXVIII,§ 1.2; app. C, at 88-89. 
79. Interview with Martha Quesada, sunra note 33; Vasilash, supra note 62, at 10; Bergstrom, 
supra note 69, at 60. 
80. Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33; see also Nowlin, supra note 68, at 6; 
Bergstrom, supra note 69, at 60. 
81. Bergstrom, supra note 69, at 86, 89, 91; see Adler, supra note 2, at 102-04. 
82. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 8. 
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as if the first shift had completed the process. 83 
Compared to traditional automobile factory workers, NUMMI 
workers are expected to perform rapidly and identically, repetitive tasks, 
under substantially greater pressure toward perfection, and with the 
additional responsibility of spotting, diagnosing, and if necessary 
stopping the line to correct either their own errors or those of others. 84 
The just-in-time process, and the timing and balancing of the component 
jobs within the particular team's work process, makes each team 
member's timing and quality dependent upon prior team members' 
proper performance. The combination of the just-in-time process, kanban 
cards, jidoka, kaizen, and the team structure permit ready identification 
of and feedback to any worker whose performance is causing deficiencies 
in quality or quantity of productiqn. Employees are therefore motivated 
not only by professionalism and loyalty to the company as a whole, and 
by fear of loss of employment, but by close peer pressure and group 
loyalty toward their team, and by pressure generated by other teams 
farther downstream in the production process.85 
Plainly, the motivation works. It induces employees to work 
productive1y and effectively, and to share suggestions and improvements 
within the team and for the production process as a whole.86 More 
negatively, however, the cumulative process may be viewed as 
management's use of "weapons of transparency, surveillance, peer group 
pressures in teams, and control between teams,"87 to promote manage-
ment control over the workforce, offsetting the inherent dependency on 
labor built into a just-in-time, worker participation system.88 These 
psychological factors, as well as the more rapid pace of the production 
process, have caused a militant wing within the labor movement to label 
the process "manageme~t by stress."89 
83. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
84. Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33; Robert Rehder & Howard Finston, How 
Is Detroit Responding to Japanese and Swedish Organization and Management Systems, 33 INDUS. 
MGMT. 6, 7-8 {1991). 
85. See, e.g., Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8 (noting that "(t]he typical Japanese 
transplant team organization is a powerful social control system based on peer pressure."). 
86. See Adler, supra note 2, at 105-06; Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8. 
87. Humphrey, supra note 53, at 99. 
88. See Humphrey, supra note 53, at 97, 99-100. 
89. PARKER & SLAUGHTER. supra note 32, at 16-19. 
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5. Practices to Complement The Four Basic Manufacturing Concepts 
NUMMI relies upon two other key practices to implement its 
foundation philosophy. The first is extensive integration of suppliers 
upstream and dealers downstream into the company's operations.90 
NUMMI is not quite yet a "boundary-less" corporation,91 but it is much 
farther along that path than the typical American corporation. 
Second, NUMMI relies heavily upon initial and continuing training 
to ensure that its workforce has the requisite skills. NUMMI is 
committed to intense investment in its human capital and embraces a 
philosophy of promotion from within. The company trains workers in 
the job analyzation methodology they will need to perform the technical 
activities underlying constant improvement of their manufacturing work. 
The company also extensively trains employees in group dynamics, 
social and organizational skills which will facilitate the team process. In 
pre-team leaders' training, potential team leaders receive more intensive 
education in such topics. In addition, NUMMI and the UAW have a 
joint apprenticeship training program, to permit semi-skilled workers to 
promote from within into the craft positions in the plant.92 
NUMMI has a training and development section budgeted at about 
$800,000 per year, and workers average at least forty hours of training 
per year, plus separate training in the event of promotion. Toyota's 
approach, embraced by NUMMI, is not to compute separately, detailed 
training cost analyses. The company views training as a long-term 
investment in its human capital, which will eventually reap its own 
reward.93 A typical U.S. business devotes its training budget to about 
90. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 5, 10; Martinez Presentation, supra note 1. Professor 
Badaracco summarizes relations between Toyota, the model for NUMMI, and its suppliers: 
Toyota exercises hegemonic influence over its family of suppliers. It usually buys a large 
fraction of their output, often helps finance them, provides equipment and managerial 
advice, and sometimes lends its executives to them. Above all, it has integrated their 
production operations, intricately and intimately, with its assembly operations throughJIT 
(just-in-time) supplying. 
Badaracco, supra note 14, at 14; see also Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 192; Joel Cutcher-
Gershenfeld & Patrick P. McHugh, Competition and Divergence: Collective Bargaining in the Nonh 
American Auto Supply Industry, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR 225, 230 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994) (discussing integration between transplants and just-in-
time suppliers); accord Kenney and Florida, supra note 15, at 24, 26, 28-29. 
91. For a broader discussion of the "boundary-less" corporation, see Frederick E. Webster, Jr., 
The Changing Role of Marketing in the Corporation, 56 J. OF MKTG. 1, 12 (Oct. 1992). 
92. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Burch Presentation, supra note 1. 
93. Martinez Presentation, supra note 1. 
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ten percent of its employees, primarily managerial level. NUMMI 
regularly provides training to all of its employees.94 
lY. THE COLLECTNE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP AND LABOR 
RELATIONS 
A. Labor-Management Relations as Embodied in the Text of the 
Labor Agreement 
The collective bargaining agreement, and the labor-management 
relationship that it establishes, are distinctive in many respects. 
Emphasizing that the relationship is to be one of mutual trust and 
respect,95 the agreement incorporates certain key features to implement 
this philosophy, together with the team concept96 and the production 
methods described previously.97 
1. Information and Consultation 
First, NUMMI agrees to provide the UAW with advance information 
about all major business issues, including semi-annual business plans, 
major organizational changes, the company's long range plans and 
policies, quarterly production schedules, contemplated outsourcing or 
insourcing decisions, and technological changes which will affect 
bargaining unit work.98 Obligatory information-sharing goes far beyond 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. Moreover, as to the broad range of 
matters directly relating to terms and conditions of employment, the 
company agrees to provide advance information and to engage in 
advance consultation with the union.99 
The collective bargaining agreement establishes multiple forums for 
information sharing, and structures a somewhat sequential process as 
NUMMI decisions move through concretization and into implementation. 
Typically, discussions begin as early, informal "advance information" 
94. See Nowlin, supra note 68, at 7-9; Vasilash, supra note 5, at 40. 
95. Burch Presentation, supra note I; NUMMI Script, supra note I, at 9; NUMMI-UAW 
AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. I, § l.l; art. IX, § I. 
96. See NUMMI-UA W AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. II, §§ 1.3, 1.6; art. XIV. 
97. See NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. II,§§ 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6. 
98. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. II, § 1.4; see also NUMMI-UAW 
AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. XXVIII,§ 1.3 (listing monthly production schedule meetings). 
99. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. II,§ 1.4. 
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discussions. As operational decisions begin to evolve, further discussions 
ensue in meetings under more formal, top level, and later section level, 
"joint conferences." In addition, the agreement provides for formal, 
frequent, round-table communications among company and union leaders 
in both executive and sectional level conferences, at which both sides 
keep their opposite numbers broadly informed and share mutual 
concerns, focusing on specific, operational decisions, especially those 
affecting the workforce. Lines of communication in both directions are 
thereby kept wide open, whether the corporate or union matter is linked 
to employment directly, indirectly, or not at al1.100 
This labor-management relationship has sharply departed from the 
traditional "the company acts, the union reacts" scenario. Instead, the 
company attempts to work out an agreement with the union prior to the 
finalization and implementation of important changes affecting employ-
ees.Ioi 
2. Consensus-based Problem-solving and Advance Agreement in 
Lieu of Adversarial Grievance Dispute Resolution 
Second, the grievance procedure is characterized as a "non-
confrontational, problem-resolution procedure based on discussion and 
consensus."102 In structure, the details differ little from a typical 
collectively-bargained grievance and arbitration procedure. 103 The 
contractual verbiage, however, is more conciliatory, and less adversarial 
and litigious in tone.104 Moreover, the attitudes of the participants in 
100. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. IX, §§ 1-2; Letter of Understanding from 
Thomas King, Jr., NUMMI Manager, Labor Relations, to George Nano, UA W Local 2244 
Bargaining Committee Chairman (July 1, 1991), ~ 8 (attached to NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT); see 
also Burch Presentation, supra note 1; Martinez Presentation, supra note 1. 
101. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. II, § 1.4. 
102. NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 9. 
103. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note l, at art. X. The "Problem Resolution Procedure" 
sets forth a pyramid dispute resolution process similar to those in more traditional, automobile 
industry agreements. 
104. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. X. For example, the NUMMI-UAW 
Agreement grievance procedure provisions include the following language: 
Because of the value and importance of full discussion in clearing up misunderstandings 
and preserving harmonious relations, every reasonable effort shall be made to resolve 
problems promptly at this point through discussion. The resolution of an employee 
problem at this stage shall not set a precedent or a binding past practice on either party. 
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. X,§ 2.2. 
The agreement reflects this approach in multiple provisions. The introductory language 
provides: "[i]n the administration of this Agreement, and in our day-to-day relationship, we will 
exhibit mutual trust, understanding and sincerity, and, to the fullest extent possible, will avoid 
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utilizing the process are far more cooperative on all sides.105 Union 
representation is farther removed from the shop floor compared to a 
typical auto industry collective bargaining agreement, with more 
employees per union representative, 106 and with consultation regarding 
grievances arranged for employee break-time to minimize disruption of 
production.107 Most significantly, many issues are resolved by advance 
agreement oflabor and management, exempting them from the grievance 
and arbitration process entirely. 108 NUMMI's rate of grievances and 
arbitration is minuscule, and contrasts sharply with the inordinately high 
rate of grievance filings and arbitrations when the plant was operated by 
GM.1o9 
3. Job Security 
Third, the company commits to a job security clause recognizing its 
confrontational tactics." NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. I, § 1.2. Among the 
parties' mutual commitments and responsibilities, they agree to ''resolve employee concerns through 
procedures using problem solving and non-adversarial techniques that are based on consensus instead 
of confrontation." NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. II,§ 1.3. 
105. The role of the "union coordinator" at the informal, first step of the procedure is explicitly 
cooperative, rather than confrontational. See NUMMI-UA W AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. X, 
§ 2.2 ("clearing up misunderstandings and preserving harmonious relations.''). The role of the 
district committeeperson is defined to be both cooperative and confrontational. See NUMMI-UA W 
AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, § 6.2. Section 6 notes that duties include 
meeting with the Company to resolve complaints under the Problem Resolution 
Procedure; [p]articipating with the Company in Standards of Conduct and Attendance 
Counselling Committees; [j]oint investigations with the Company in potential suspen-
sion/discharge cases; [r]epresent[ing] an employee ... in disciplinary action that may 
result in suspension or discharge; and ... cooperating with the company in implementing 
Labor Relations Policies such as attendance control, vacation scheduling, safety records, 
call-in duties, lost-time accident reports, and leaves of absence. 
NUMMI-UA W AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, § 6. The rank and file's perception that 
some committeepersons and bargaining committee members were insufficiently identified with 
workers' interests probably was a key factor in electoral turnover in these offices. Quesada 
interview, supra note 33. 
106. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. Employees are to see their ''union coordinator" 
regarding unresolved problems. NUMMI-UA W AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. X, § 2.1. There 
is one coordinator for every two groups, producing a fairly low employee to representative ratio. 
NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, §10.1. At the second level, however, the 
contract provides for 10 or 12 district committeepersons, representing some 3,500 bargaining unit 
employees. A more typical automobile industry ratio would be 250:1, or less. NUMMI-UAW 
AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. VIII, § 5.1. 
107. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. VIII,§ 10.3; art. X,§ 2.1. 
108. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. X, § 1.1 (exempting those employee 
"problems" subject to other resolution procedures). 
109. See Adler, supra note 2, at 99. Grievances decreased from 2000 pending when GM-
Fremont closed to 700 filed at NUMMI over an eight year period. Adler, supra note 2, at 99. 
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"responsibility, with the cooperation of the Union, to provide stable 
employment to the workers ... [and agreeing] that it will not lay off 
employees unless compelled to do so by severe economic conditions that 
threaten the long term financial viability of the Company."110 In 
addition, NUMMI commits to taking "affirmative measures before laying 
off any employees," including, but not limited to, reducing the salaries 
of NUMMI officers and management, and reassigning work normally 
performed by subcontractors to qualified bargaining unit employees.111 
The company is very proud of this clause, although it was initially 
reluctant to reduce it to writing, and to enforceably commit to this 
longstanding, oft-stated corporate policy.112 Nevertheless the company 
has, so far, thoroughly adhered to this commitment. In 1987, car sales 
were slow and production schedules were drastically cut. The company, 
instead of opting for layoffs, provided all workers with forty hours of 
training on topics such as job safety, work standards, and problem 
solving. People were rotated between those jobs and production work, 
and everyone remained on the active, full-time payroll.113 Similarly, 
during annual model change-overs, unlike traditional automobile plants, 
NUMMI does not close down, but conducts training and employs 
unoccupied workers on deferred plant maintenance projects, such as 
painting the walls. 114 
This policy has built immense trust in a workforce inured to the GM 
tradition of layoffs roughly every year because of model changes and 
market fluctuations. The NUMMI commitment to job security has 
reinforced the employees' willingness to make productivity improvement 
suggestions they might otherwise withhold. As Ms. Quesada put it: 
I ... as a regular worker ... in my department can make changes 
within my system. The only reason I am willing to do that is because 
I have been guaranteed that no matter what jobs I eliminate no one will 
be laid-off. Now if you had ever told me that the gentleman on my 
right was going to lose his job as a result of my improving something, 
as a result of my installing a robot that is now doing his job, I 
would've never done it. There is no way that I as a good union person 
110. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. III. 
111. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. III. 
112. NUMMI boasts that the clause "is considered to be the strongest in the industry." NUMMI 
Script, supra note 1, at 9. 
113. Burch Presentation, supra note 1. 
114. Burch Presentation, supra note 1. 
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would help management in eliminating a job.115 
Because of the job security covenant, she could explain that "what 
we have done is made changes that improve things for workers" by 
installing robots to perform particularly difficult and injurious tasks, such 
as seat installation. n6 
4. Flexible Attendance and Acceptance of the Worker As A Mature 
Adult 
Fourth, there is a flexible attendance policy which treats employees 
like adults, assuming they will miss work only for important family and 
personal reasons. 117 There are no time clocks.118 This trust is bol-
stered, in practice, by the powerful peer pressure exerted by remaining 
team members who must pick up the slack for the absent co-worker.119 
5. Advance Consultation With the Union in Major Disciplinary 
Cases 
Fifth, the company agrees to review, with union officials, mitigating 
circumstances prior to suspension or discharge of a worker. 120 Again, 
this modifies the traditional "employer decision, union grievance" 
scenario in favor of attempts to reach consensus in advance of the 
decision. 
6. Greatly Broadened Job Classifications 
Sixth, the number of job classifications is sharply reduced, from 
over 100 in the GM era to three, one for production work, and two for 
skilled trades, ensuring NUMMI a maximally flexible workforce. 121 
115. Quesada Presentation, supra note I. 
116. Quesada Presentation, supra note I. 
117. Martinez Presentation, supra note I; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, 
at art. XXIII. 
118. Burch Presentatio~, supra note 1. 
119. See, e.g., Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8. 
120. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. X,§ 11.2. 
121. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. XVII,§ 1.1. Article XVII, section 1.1 
lists three classifications: Division I (production) and Division II (general maintenance and tool and 
die). NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. XVII, § 1.1; see Vasilash, supra note 5, at 
39. 
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7. Employees Empowered To Stop The Assembly Line 
Seventh, the broad "no-strike" clause applies to all disputes, but the 
employees are nevertheless trusted and expected to pull the Andon cord 
and stop the assembly line when necessary for reasons of safety as well 
as production quality.122 
8. Enhanced Security For The Union 
In the spirit of mutual trust and the expectation of a stable 
relationship, NUMMI has also agreed to a form of organizational security 
for the union, as well as job security for the individual employees. The 
parties have signed a letter of understanding which affords the union the 
option of card check recognition, in the event that future facilities are 
opened by NUMMI.123 
9. Overall 
Perhaps most important is the overall approach of the agreement. 
It is much shorter and less detailed than a typical UAW collective 
bargaining agreement, and many of the commitments contained in it are 
broader and more general. These provisions are aimed at capturing 
shared purposes and intent, rather than pinning down details in anticipa-
tion of breach of contract and arbitral enforcement. 124 The union 
abandons conventional "job control" strategies. In return, it gains the 
subtler power built into the vulnerability to disruption of a manufacturing 
process highly dependent upon the good will and strenuous voluntary 
efforts of workers, as well as the union's explicit participatory role in 
consensus-oriented strategic and functional decisionmaking processes. 
While based upon Japanese cultural approaches to contractual relation-
ships built upon mutual trust,125 the NUMMI-UAW contract also 
accords more closely to the model of the collective bargaining agreement 
as laying a constitutional foundation of principles guiding the parties' 
122. NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at art. XXVII,§ 12 (prohibition of strikes and 
lockouts); art. XXVIII, § 1.2 (permitting stopping the assembly line without risk of discipline). 
123. Letter of Understanding from D.W. Childs, Vice President of Human Resources to Bruce 
Lee, Director, Region 6, UAW (June 30, 1988), 1]3 (attached to NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT); see 
also Quesada Presentation, supra note I. 
124. Burch Presentation, supra note I. 
125. Burch Presentation, supra note I. 
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relationship, and then serving as a living document under which they 
negotiate the resolution of particular problems as they arise. Such a 
relationship epitomizes the philosophy of trust underlying this form of 
labor-management cooperation. 
B. Employee Relations 
The company encapsulates its employee relations philosophy in four 
summarizing concepts: 
1) mutual trust and respect; 
2) teamwork and the team concept; 
3) equity and fair treatment; and 
4) employee involvement. 126 
The company has taken steps to eliminate nearly all of the 
traditional indicia of corporate hierarchy, such as separate enclosed 
offices, different clothing, separate parking areas or dining rooms.127 
Rather, NUMIVII embraces the concept that each worker is a member of 
the company-wide team, making an appropriate contribution to its overall 
success, and entitled to be equally valued and treated with dignity and 
respect. 128 
NUMIVII follows a philosophy of training and promoting from 
within, including a vigorous joint (labor-management) apprenticeship 
training program for skilled jobs, which has so far graduated about fifty 
apprentices.129 
NUMIVII's policy of teamwork and employee involvement embraces 
the notion of pushing decision-making down to the lowest possible 
level. 130 Employees do not merely participate by reorganizing the work 
in which they are immediately involved. Through a company-wide 
suggestion program, employees are able to suggest improvements in 
operations at all levels. The average participation rate in such programs 
126. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; NUMMI Script, supra note 1, at 12; see also NUMMI-
UAW AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. II,§ 1.3; art. XIV,§ 1.1. 
127. Burch Presentation, supra note 1. Contrast this with Quesada's recollection of being forced 
out of the GM-Fremont salaried employees' ladies room, when she attempted to use it during a visit 
to the front office. Quesada presentation, supra note 1. 
128. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at 
art. II, § 1.6; art. XIV, § 1.1. 
129. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; see also NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT, supra note I, at 
art. XXIX (detailing the apprenticeship training program). 
130. Burch Presentation, supra note I. 
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in the U.S. is about fifteen or twenty percent, but at NUMMI in 1993, 
ninety~four percent of employees participated through one or more 
suggestions, totalling over 14,000.131 With an average of three sugges~ 
tions per year per worker, 132 it is evident that many employees actively 
participate. No doubt this is because NUMMI management consistently 
implements a high proportion of the suggestions.133 
The workforce at NUMMI is extremely racially diverse, approxi-
mately thirty percent female, although there are only a few women in 
skilled trades.134 It has taken a while for management to adjust to 
working with such a diverse, nonhomogeneous workforce. 135 
V. EMPLOYEE ATIITUDES AND SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION 
The most moving portion of the NUMMI workshop at the LaJolla 
conference was the remarks of Martha Quesada. She is a long-time GM 
Fremont plant assembly line worker and militant UAW member, now 
employed at NUMMI as an electrician, after completing the NUMMI 
apprenticeship training program. A central question regarding many of 
the corporate experiments in teams, worker participation, and lean 
production, is whether workers actually prefer involvement. Several 
commentators have contended that the heightened responsibility, faster 
pace, and greater stress inherent in teamwork~based lean production are 
outweighed only by employees' fear of job loss, in inducing cooperative 
attitudes.136 Ms. Quesada was a forceful advocate for the view that 
participation enriches the work and dignifies the worker, yet she retains 
some deep ambivalence. 
She vividly described the intense, mutual hostility between worker 
and supervisor, union member and management, that pervaded the GM 
system, workers' derogatory views about the quality of their own 
products, and their feeling of being just additional, fungible parts for the 
131. Burch Presentation, supra note 1; see also Tibbett L. Speer, Foreign Investors: An Equity 
Stake in California, 27 CAL. Bus. 22, 27 (Mar. 1992) (citing 92% of employees as offering 
suggestions in 1991 ). 
132. Burch Presentation, supra note 1. 
133. In 1991, for example, approximately 85% of employee suggestions were implemented. 
Speer, supra note 131, at 27. 
134. Quesada Presentation, supra note I. 
135. Quesada Presentation, supra note I. 
136. See PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 32, at 16-19; Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, 
at 194-95; Rehder, supra note 32, at 89-90; Young, supra note 47, at 685-88; Rehder & Finston, 
supra note 84, at 8. 
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company to use in manufacturing automobiles.137 
As a result, 
[W]hen NUMMI opened, the former GM workers were adamant about 
this new system not working. . . . We felt that it was a sellout. We 
felt that ... we as a union would really have no voice. . . . [T]here 
was debate on how you handled something like what NUMMI was 
proposing to us, ... to this group of militant people and people who 
had only been treated like dirt by GM management .... 138 
After extensive negotiations among both parent corporations and the 
UAW, 
you get this agreement, and after you come up with all these beautiful 
words about mutual trust and respect, how do you get people like 
myself to buy into it? ... How do you really take the words and the 
phrases and the cliches and make them work? . . . It's my personal 
opinion that, unfortunately, it takes a crisis before you can cooperate. 
In our situation, it was the plant closing and it was the end of a 
lifestyle for us. 139 
Ms. Quesada had such a strong reputation as a militant trade 
unionist that she had to work hard to persuade the NUMMI labor 
relations department that she could be trained to be a cooperative, 
productive employee under its system. Nevertheless, she estimated that 
it took her only about six months, rather than several years, of working 
under NUMMI management to transform her initial skepticism and 
suspicion into belief. 140 
Ms. Quesada described the immense resocialization task facing 
NUMMI management as they rehired GM workers and reopened the 
plant. NUMMI had ''to take ... people who don't believe you, people 
who don't trust you, people who had never known management to be 
honest in any sense of the word and convince them that what [NUMMI 
was] saying [was] going to work."141 
She now feels very differently about her job at NUMMI. "I happen 
to love working where I work. I've gone through training programs that 
would never have been available to me at General Motors. I've ... had 
137. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1; Interview with Martha Quesada, supra note 33. 
138. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
139. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
140. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
141. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
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opportunities that were never given to me before."142 
Quesada is not atypical. NUMMI surveys its workforce annually. 
The proportion of employees declaring themselves satisfied or very 
satisfied with their employment has risen steadily, from 76% in 1987, to 
85% in 1989, to 90% in 1991.143 Even the members of the local 
union's dissident caucus prefer NUMMI management methods to those 
of General Motors. They would prefer to reduce the pace of work, 
eliminate alleged favoritism in certain types of assignments, and put 
greater distance into the relationship between management and union 
representatives, but they support the team-based production system as a 
whole.144 
Describing her local union's relationship with NUMMI management, 
Ms. Quesada said, "Our union is still the UAW, and we can be a very 
strong union, [but] we're a more cooperative union. [T]he antagonism 
wasn't working ... .''145 
Ms. Quesada is enthusiastic about a company which treats its 
employees as full members of its team and as dignified human beings. 
Still, when pressed about trade union antagonism toward lean production 
methods and the impact of such methods on the role of the union, Ms. 
Quesada retreated in describing her motives, from the carrot to the stick. 
Her fears and guilt about being a "traitor to the trade union movement" 
revive when she is confronted with such accusations from within her own 
local union, from other local unions within the UAW, from the Canadian 
Auto Workers union, and from unions in other industries. 146 
She expressed some concern about the altered role of the union, 
particularly in shop floor representation, but Ms. Quesada then explained 
her bottom line: 
I've always been a very strong union person and I believe strongly in 
unions and hope never to have to work in a non-union shop again. 
But ... until you've walked in our shoes and been out of work for two 
years and had people kill themselves and had families divorce and had 
essentially lost everything that you ever owned, . . . you can't criticize 
142. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
143. Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 87. This is consonant with several studies suggesting that 
many workers derive increased job satisfaction from genuinely participatory working arrangements. 
See, e.g., Paula B. Voos, Introduction -An Economic Perspective on Contemporary Trends in 
Collective Bargaining, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN TilE PRIVATE SECfOR I, 5 
(Paula B. Voos ed., 1994). 
144. See Turner, supra note 2, at 234-35. 
145. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
146. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
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Ifyou (had a] community of seven thousand workers and a plant closed 
down and someone came along with a system that would allow you to 
bring back four thousand of those workers, what would you say? ... 
I wish . . . I could say that I will walk out on any issue, on any 
principle that matters that much to me, I've always felt that way .... 
[T]he competition internationally [meant]. .. that we could not continue 
in the way the Big Three, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, were 
continuing to do business. And we as a union had gotten so militant 
and so strong that we were kind of biting our nose off to spite our face. 
I think a lot of it has to do with different [economic and legal] 
situations, but I admire your [more militant, Canadian] unions and if I 
could subscribe to that, trust me, I'd be right behind you. 147 
VI. THE FOUNDATIONS OF NUI\.1MI SUCCESS 
The NUI\.1MI success story is founded on changes in structures, 
changes in processes and changes in attitudes, compared to operations 
under GM. NUI\.1MI management brought with them expectations of 
honesty, bard work, participation, and faithful performance by the 
employees, and attitudes of trust and cooperation. Once employees 
became persuaded that these attitudes were genuine, reciprocation spread 
gradually among the workforce. It is evident that the interaction of all 
three facets- structure, processes, and organizational culture- is at the 
root of NUI\.1MI's success. No one component standing alone would 
have sufficed to produce the results. 
A series of inquiries naturally follows. Which aspects of the 
NUI\.1MI system are essential, which are modifiable, which are dispens-
able? What background factors are significant in the success of this style 
of work organization, and bow adaptable is it across industries? Why 
have seemingly similar programs elsewhere proven less successful? 
Some comparisons shed light on these questions, although valid answers 
are embedded in nuances of corporate culture and workplace context, 
making analysis and generalization difficult. 
It is helpful to review the old, command and control workplace 
model, and the main factors underlying its current breakdown. The old 
model was based on routinized jobs, unskilled or semi-skilled work, 
specialization and extensive division oflabor, rigid, highly formalized job 
14 7. Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
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descriptions and many layers of bureaucratic hierarchy. It was originally 
developed to facilitate mass production. 
Three major factors are leading to its decline. First, the command 
and control model was designed for an environment of stable mass 
production, abundant natural resources, and economies of scale. This 
structure copes poorly with sudden and rapid shifts of demand now 
prevalent in an era of short product life cycles and niche markets. 
Second, full utilization of new manufacturing technologies is incompati-
ble with the division of labor between brains and brawn, management 
and labor, inherent in the command and control model. 
Third, the tacit, job control-based, social contract between labor and 
big business has broken down. The desirability to both sides has 
plummeted regarding an arrangement in which employers paid workers 
well to permit management to do all of the decisionmaking. Workers 
prefer to use their minds, and employers seek to draw upon their ideas. 
The economic presuppositions for the social contract no longer apply in 
many industries. The unions' strike weapon has weakened, and the 
extent of unionization has decreased. Hence unions' ability to remove 
wages from competition has deteriorated. The employers' ability to pass 
on wage increases through higher prices to consumers has declined under 
the pressure of global competition.148 
In contrast to the hierarchical, rigid, old system, commentators 
describe the successful organizational mode of the future as one fostering 
initiative, drive, quality, productivity, flexibility, continuous improve-
ment, continuous learning, and a shared sense of purpose among the 
workforce, qualities precluded by the traditional mode of work organiza-
tion. Many observers now believe that organizational learning is the key 
to future corporate profitability and that "high trust" and "high mutual 
commitment" organizations, such as NUMMI, are best positioned to 
succeed in the competitive environment of the future. 149 
This brief review highlights two areas in which the NUMMI model 
bears only limited application because the environment has not altered 
along the lines sketched out above. First, non-manufacturing employ-
148. John F. Tomer, The Social Causes of Economic Decline: Organizational Failure and 
Red/ining, 50 REv. OF Soc. ECON. 61, 70-71 (Mar. 1992); see also Marshall, supra note 3, at 288-
90. 
149. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 3, at 302; Tomer, supra note 148, at 74; Raymond F. 
Zammuto & Edward J. O'Connor, Gaining Advanced Manufacturing Technologies' Benefits: The 
Roles of Organization Design and Culture, 17 ACAD. OF MGMT. REv. 701, 717-18 (1992); Ernest 
J. Savoie, Rough Terrain for Collective Bargaining: A Management View, in CONTEMPORARY 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN TilE PRIVATE SECfOR 529, 534 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994). 
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ment, while traditionally subject to hierarchical, bureaucratic manage-
ment, has otherwise varied tremendously in its conformity to a job 
control model and involves productivity and quality variables that may 
be harder to measure than those in manufacturing, both in the past and 
today. Separate consideration should be given to quality improvement, 
productivity, and quality of work life justifications for both old and new 
methods of work organization in service sector workplaces. Second, 
within manufacturing, in those industries where long production runs and 
economies of scale continue to dominate, and particularly if other aspects 
of historic conditions remain intact, the command and control model may 
be more efficient than any alternative. 
Team-based organization may have been oversold as the key to 
success in a wide range of business organizations. Teams are especially 
valuable in businesses requiring flexibility. In industries where products 
or services are seldom modified, traditional hierarchical structures may 
be more efficient. On the other hand, if products or services are too 
variable, the time entailed in coordination and reorganization of team 
efforts may outweigh productivity gains, making individual-based 
operations more successful. 150 In manufacturing, the standardized work 
aspect ofNUM:MI's lean production model is probably subject to similar 
constraints. 151 
Moreover, the utility of team-based production depends upon the 
extent to which within each team, the jobs of team members are, or can 
be, redesigned as interdependent. The successful completion of the work 
for which the team is responsible should depend heavily on collective, 
rather than individual effort, and successful performance of individual 
tasks should demand close and frequent coordination among team 
members. Team size should also remain small, ranging from five to ten 
members. 152 
An industry may satisfY other pre-conditions for success with a lean 
150. See Kathryn M. Bartol & Laura L. Hagmann, Team-Based Pay Plans: A Key to Effective 
Teamwork, 24 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV. 24, 27 (Nov. 1992); Paul S. Adler & Robert E. 
Cole, Rejoinder, 35 SLOAN MGMT. REv. 45,48 (Winter 1994); cf. Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett 
Harrison, Unions, Technology, and Labor-Management Cooperation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC 
COMPETITIVENESS 247, 266-69 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992) (finding that 
employee participation programs render produdtion significantly less efficient in nonunion plants, 
and not significantly more efficient in metalworking and machinery sector unionized plants. 
Unionized plants were more efficient than nonunion, regardless of worker participation programs.) 
151. See Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 48. 
152. Bartol & Hagmann, supra note 150, at 25-27. Adler & Cole also limit their belief in the 
superiority of lean production coupled with worker participation to the context of high volume, fairly 
repetitive, labor-intensive production. Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 48-49. 
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production, team-based system, but find that existing technology renders 
it inefficient to reorganize work for teams of five to ten with interdepen-
dent functions. Factors regarding the suitability of the industry, its 
external environment, and technological constraints on the organization 
of manufacturing operations may account for much of the divergence of 
experience with team-based, lean production. Studies of new production 
organization which aggregate data may obscure such important, 
differentiating variables. 
NUMMI is the quintessential, lean production, worker participation 
company in most respects, but its distinctive features bear noting. 
Because it has operated so successfully with an independent, industrial 
union, it belies the argument that Japanese and similar lean production 
methods cannot be accomplished in a unionized environment. Indeed, 
some recent research suggests that, at least in the U.S., most non-union 
employee involvement programs fail because of the lack of autonomy 
and enforceable job security of the employee groups, while programs in 
unionized settings are more likely to succeed because the unions and 
workers have enough independent leverage to press for significant 
change.153 
NUMMI also calls into question the contention that "greenfield" 
operations are far more successful with lean production methods than 
converting existing plants and workforce.154 Greater initial skill and 
understanding may be required of management to build trust with a 
suspicious workforce, but thereafter, there appears to be little difference 
in long term success. The six month period required for Martha 
Quesada's change in attitude, if typical, suggests that a mass attitudinal 
shift to a new corporate culture is more feasible, in far shorter time, than 
often assumed. 
NUMMI did not rehire members of GM's lower and middle 
management. The wholesale change was certainly important in 
persuading workers that the new: management had internalized very 
153. See Kelley & Harrison, supra note 150, at 255-56, 275-76; Brown, supra note 3, at 43-44, 
46. 
154. See Thomas A. Mahoney & John R. Deckop, Y'gotta Believe: Lessons from American-vs. 
Japanese-Run U.S. Factories, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 27 (Spring 1993) (concluding that the 
success of Japanese manufacturing models in U.S. plants is mainly dependent upon managerial 
values). Apparently, GM has successfully retrained for lean production teams of auto workers 
formerly employed in the brownest of possible settings, the state-owned East German Wartburg 
plant, now owned by Opel. See Karen L. Miller & Kathleen Kerwin, GM's German Lessons, Bus. 
WK., Dec. 20, 1993, at 67, 68. 
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different attitudes towards workers , than their predecessors.155 More-
over, supervisors and middle managers often pose a greater obstacle to 
innovative labor-management relations schemes than rank and file 
workers because of managers' reluctance to accede power and position 
to their subordinates. 156 
NUMMI follows a philosophy contrary to the recommendations of 
most experts, in providing no gainsharing or productivity or skill 
improvement rewards for individuals or teams, but only a small bonus 
for the entire hourly workforce if their products meet external recognition 
goals.157 Pride in product, a good day's pay for a hard day's work, and 
identification with the company as a whole through membership in the 
larger "team," have produced sufficient motivating forces to yield 
NUMMI's outstanding results. NUMMI's ongoing investment in training 
the entire workforce in teamwork-related empowerment techniques no 
doubt also contributes to its success. 158 
NUMMI relies less on the new generation of high technology 
systems automation than many other automobile plants, either in Japan 
or in the U.S.159 The company believes that "the key to productivity 
is simplicity,"160 because "automation is not as flexible as a multi-
skilled worker."161 Central to the successful NUMMI philosophy is the 
155. Quesada Presentation, supra note I. 
156. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 45; see also Humphrey, supra note 53, at 107; Zammuto 
& O'Connor, supra note 149, at 718 (commenting that ''these changes disrupt existing power and 
status networks making significant resistance likely as well as costly and time-consuming to 
overcome.''). 
157. The Performance Improvement Plan Sharing program [hereinafter PIPS], establishing a 
maximum annual bonus of $1,600 per employee is outlined in the Letter of Understanding from 
Thomas King, Jr., Manager, Labor Relations, to George Nano, Chairman, Bargaining Committee 
(July I, 1991), ~ 9 and attached Exhibit "A" (attached to NUMMI-UAW AGREEMENT). See also 
Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 87. For a description of recommended forms regarding merit or 
incentive pay practices designed to accompany lean production and team-based manufacturing, see 
generally Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 90; Bartol & Hagmann, supra note 150, at 27-29. NUMMI 
may have chosen to follow W.E. Deming's philosophy in avoiding such compensation systems. He 
disapproves of incentive pay systems because they inevitably require appropriate forms of work 
measurement, creating the risk that the workers will "game the system" to maximize their own 
personal rewards instead of focusing on company goals. See Sanjiv Sarin, Can Work Measurement 
and TQM Get Along? 25 INDUS. ENGINEERING 14-15 (Oct. 1993). 
158. Cf Brown, supra note 3, at 44 (one reason so many corporate experiments in employee 
involvement fail is management's unwillingness to invest time and money in pertinent training); 
Nowlin, supra note 68, at 7-9. 
159. See, e.g., Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 21; Marshall, supra note 3, at 302. 
160. Kevin L. Miller, The Factory Guru Tinkering with Toyota, Bus. WK., May 17, 1993, at 95 
(quoting Toyota Director of Production Engineering Mikio Kitano, formerly employed at NUMMI). 
161. Id. (quoting Professor Koichi Shimokawa). 
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proposition that "men control machines, not the other way around."162 
NUMMI's prospects for success were greatly advanced by its 
determination to avoid layoffs in 1987, despite the sharp reduction in 
production. Analysts universally agree with the thrust of Martha 
Quesada's comments, that absent a deep managerial commitment to job 
security for employees, workers will be unwilling to participate in 
improving productivity when they may be improving themselves or 
coworkers right out of a job. 163 
Finally, the crisis generated by GM's closure of the plant drastically 
altered the thinking and behavior of the union, workers, and community. 
The NUMMI workforce has been characterized as traumatized by the 
previous plant closure and desperately fearful of employment loss.164 
NUMMI fits within the broad pattern of "crisis to cooperation," despite 
the company technically being a new operation. Nevertheless, the factor 
may be overemphasized in many accounts; later hires not involved in the 
plant closure are indistinguishable from more senior workers in their 
enthusiasm about working at NUMMI. 
Comparisons ofNUMMI to other automobile industry operations are 
instructive in holding constant for "hard," industry-based constraints, 
highlighting the significance of human relations factors. Team-based 
operation, in any industry, requires that: (1) management at all levels 
fully support the team concept; (2) the norms, beliefs and values of the 
company include mutual trust, respect, and confidence, and the organiza-
tional culture as a whole encourage both vertical and horizontal 
cooperation among employees; (3) the company have a flat organization-
al hierarchy; and (4) the company have flexible communication 
channels, good communication skills, and an open flow of informa-
tion.165 The NUMMI organization, top to bottom, epitomizes these 
factors. 
One may profitably compare the use of the Japanese lean produc-
tion/worker participation model at NUMMI with its less successful 
162. /d. 
163. See, e.g., Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary Innovations in 
Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC 
COMPETITIVENESS 173, 195-96 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eels., 1992) (arguing that "job 
loss, reduced amount of employment, and wage reductions are all feared"); Kelley & Harrison, supra 
note 150, at 256-57; Voos, supra note 143, at 5; Nowlin, supra note 68, at 9, 30; see also 
Humphrey, supra note 53, at 103-04 (detailing a Brazilian study). 
164. See Turner, supra note 2, at 6. "In the minds ofNUMMI employees, job security is closely 
tied to continued high levels of productivity, quality, and constant improvement." Rehder & Finston, 
supra note 84, at 7-8. 
165. Bartol & Hagmann, supra note 150, at 25-27. 
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adaptation at several other automobile transplant and joint venture 
facilities. These and other Japanese transplants started out espousing a 
common set of formal structures and organizational values, including the 
team concept, a quest for perfection as to both quality and quantity 
(jidoka and kaizen ), mutual trust, stable employment, win-win labor 
management relations or harmonious employee relations, and just-in-time 
inventories. 166 
However, the gap between conception and execution seems to have 
been considerably greater at other transplant facilities than at NUJMMI. 
NUlMMI has, at least so far, managed to transplant key intangibles which 
have fallen by the way side in many of the other Japanese transplant 
operations: openness, sharing of both power and information, a culture 
of shared membership in a team running throughout all vertical and 
horizontal relationships in the plant, and a hostility to the opposite-turf 
control, power brokering, information hoarding. 167 
The collective bargaining relationships between CAMI and the 
Canadian Auto Workers ("CAW''), covering the OM-Suzuki joint venture 
in Ingersoll, Ontario; between AutoAlliance, Inc. and the UAW, covering 
the Mazda-Ford joint venture in Flat Rock, Michigan; and between 
Diamond Star Motors Corp. and the UAW, a Mitsubishi-Chrysler joint 
venture in Normal, Illinois; as well as the non-union Subaru-Isuzu joint 
venture automobile plant in Lafayette, Indiana, represent less successful 
efforts to institute teamwork-based, intensified work, continuous 
improvement, lean production models. In each of these plants, aspects 
of the Japanese model eventually broke down because of what workers 
perceived as broken promises of shared decisionmaking on the job. If 
a proposed manufacturing practice strongly affected both the bottom line 
and workers' job conditions, or in some plants, if the supervisor's own 
power or interests were at stake, "consensus" was only possible on 
management's terms. 168 In addition, in at least some cases, the trans-
166. Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 6. 
167. See Bergstrom, supra note 69, at 60; see also Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 89-91. 
168. See Liz Pinto, Japanese labor Ideals Don't Fly, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Nov. 9, 1992, at 3; 
see also Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 214 (transplant facilities are evolving into diverse 
combinations of typical as well as innovative Japanese manufacturing practices). For an overview 
on CAMI, see Yanarella & Green, supra note 9, at 66-70. For an overview on Mazda, see Steve 
Babson, Lean or Mean: The MIT Model and Lean Production at Mazda, 18 LAB. STUD. J. 3 
(Summer 1993); Christian Berggren, NUMMI vs. Uddevalla, 35 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 37, 45 n.l2 
(Winter 1994) (Mazda/AutoAIIiance's and OM/Suzuki's outcome is very different than at NUMM1). 
Babson quoted a AutoAIIiance human resources manager saying, Mazda had "a very unhappy 
workforce." Babson, supra note. Mazda's difficulties ultimately led to Ford assuming a more 
explicit joint venture role, and greater responsibility in the management of the enterprise. Yanarella 
HeinOnline -- 13 Hofstra Lab. L. J. 467 1995-1996
1996] NUMMI- Driven to Excellence 467 
plant firms inflexibly attempted to institute and retain the Japanese model 
wholesale, with few changes tailored to fit the very different North 
American social and institutional culture. This seems to have played an 
important role in the failure of lean production/worker participation 
models at several plants. 169 
The NUrvfMI success story is not just one of transplantation of 
Japanese philosophy and methods to the United States. While NUM:MI 
management initially attempted to do this, over time, the corporate 
culture has been Americanized, creating more breathing room for 
individuality and greater acceptance of conflict than is customary in a 
land where conformity is traditional. NUrvfMI has been described as "a 
more humanistic variant [of the Toyota system, designed] to accommo-
date an older and more militant labor force."170 Several observers have 
predicted that successful transplantation of Japanese manufacturing 
systems to U.S. industry would require modification of both historic U.S. 
manufacturing methods, particularly work organization and labor 
management relations, and modification of Japanese practices.171 
The mood in some transplant facilities was summarized by Rehder 
and Finston: "Many U.S. transplant employees are asking what the point 
is of duty, loyalty, quality, teamwork, and productivity if the end result 
is loss of individual freedom, compromised individual due process, and 
diminished quality of work life."172 As Steve Babson noted in his 
study of the Mazda plant, "the emancipative potential of lean production 
is easy to invoke in the abstract, but difficult to specify in concrete 
terms; [meaningful analysis depends on] detailed inspection of how 
power is distributed and conflict negotiated."173 The problem of 
& Green, supra note 9, at 60 n.24; Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 215 n.5 (outlining the 
changes in corporate ownership at the plant). 
169. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 678-79. 
170. Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 49; see also Tomer, supra note 148, at 74; Turner, supra 
note 2, at 235. Adler & Cole wrote, "A good case can be made that the Japanese have been forced 
to modify the harsher aspects of their production system to make them more compatible with the 
expectations of Western workers." Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 88. 
171. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 678. For a broader description ofJapanese management 
philosophies, their relationship to Japanese manufacturing techniques, and an in depth discussion of 
how the differences between Mexican and Japanese cultures may affect the adoption of Japanese 
manufacturing methods, see generally John J. Lawrence & Rejh-Song Yeh, The Influence of Mexican 
Culture on the Use of Japanese Manufacturing Techniques in Mexico, 34 MGMT INT'L REv., 49, 57-
59 (1994). For a description of the value differences between Japanese and American societies 
posing obstacles to the straightforward adoption of Japanese lean production methods in the U.S., 
see Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 17. 
172. Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 6. 
173. Babson, supra note 168, at 3. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Hofstra Lab. L. J. 468 1995-1996
468 HofStra Labor Law Journal [Vol. 13:2 
consistent leadership and thorough managerial commitment to the power 
sharing entailed in employee empowerment has been the stumbling block 
in many efforts to institute such corporate transformations, and hardly 
limited to the auto industry transplant operations.174 
Numerous American companies have attempted to "cherry pick" 
features of the model, attempting to institute intensified work, reduced 
buffers, and other lean production practices while generally maintaining 
the command and control model of employer-employee relations and in 
particular, preserving more flexibility regarding job security promis-
es. 175 Practice among domestic auto manufacturers has been extremely 
diverse at the plant level, although recent national collective bargaining 
agreements between the UAW and the Big Three have provided workers 
with increasing levels of income and job security.176 
Central to the success of the NUMMI version of employee 
empowerment is the depth of delegation of true decision-making power. 
One employee involvement consultant has categorized three options for 
employers soliciting employee input into problem solving: management 
can ask for input but make the final decision alone, management can ask 
for the employee group's recommendation, participate in the discussion 
and decisionmaking, but reserve the right to veto the decision; or 
management can wholly delegate the decisionmaking to the group, by 
agreeing in advance to follow the group's consensus. 177 The teams at 
NUMMI have this third, final level of authority, or something very close 
to it, as to most operational matters affecting the work they do day-to-. 
day. As to many broader matters, management deals with both the union 
and the work teams in a way approximating the middle position, 
attempting to reach mutual consensus, while not committing to imple-
menting the consensus outcome. Even as to areas of broad entrepreneur-
ial decisionmaking, such as changes in manufacturing or product, the 
union is informed early on, and its reactions sought. 
Most American businesses, on the other hand, apply the "employee 
involvement" label to programs which seek employee ideas and 
suggestions while reserving all decisionmaking power to management 
and narrowly circumscribing the sphere in which employee participation 
is sought. Such programs tend to be abandoned within a few years.178 
174. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 42, 45-46. 
175. See, e.g., Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 195. 
176. Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 203-08. 
177. Brown, supra note 3, at 45. 
178. See, e.g., Kelley & Harrison, supra note ISO, at 254-55, 277. 
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A large part of the reason the workers and the union believe NUlV1MI 
means business when it speaks of employee participation is that the 
company's participation structures and processes actually share large 
swaths of real decisionmaking authority with the employees in teams or 
through their union, and members of management throughout the 
hierarchy by and large act in conformity with the values they es-
pouse.179 Counterfeits simply don't work, at least over extended 
periods of time. 180 
One should not overstate NUJ\.1Ivii's commitment to the UAW. The 
company has in effect, agreed not to try to eliminate or escape from the 
union, unless it closes the business completely. Yet NUMMI has used 
its heavy leverage in the form of new investment and expansion of jobs 
in the plant, and the reverse, the threat of disinvestment and decline, to 
extract concessions on several occasions going beyond what the union 
and the work force felt it could comfortably live with. Such pressure-
based changes plainly fray the fabric of the NUMMI-UAW relation-
ship.181 In addition, Toyota, the managing partner in the joint venture, 
has chosen to operate all of its non-joint venture plants in North America 
on a non-union basis.182 Moreover, unionization of NUlV1MI was 
acceptable to Toyota if, and only if, the union was willing to function 
within the company's broadly defined parameters for the role of the 
union, which required it to accept the premise that mutual advantage is 
to be gained through harmonious industrial relations.183 It appears to 
be Toyota's view, like many other Japanese transplants operating in the 
U.S., that reconciling independent union representation with their 
179. Cf. Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 48 (commenting that ''the highly disciplined Toyota 
approach is viable from a human point of view only when associated with a management system 
considerably more enlightened than that found in the average U.S. [assembly] plant."). 
180. See, e.g., Kelley & Harrison, supra note 150, at 254-55, 277. Ol)e analyst has 
hypothesized, "The greater an organization's emphasis on control-oriented values, the more likely 
it will experience implementation failure" in efforts to gain productivity and flexibility benefits from 
advanced manufacturing technologies. Zammuto & O'Connor, supra note 149, at 716. 
181. Compare Voos, supra note 143, at 17 (expressing doubts about the viability of combining 
hard bargaining strategies with shopfloor participation programs) with RICHARD E. WALTON ET AL., 
STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS x, 212, 321, 350 (1994) (contending that for corporate management 
seeking transition from traditional to lean production/team based work organization systems, optimal 
negotiation strategy is a combination of"forcing," i.e., confrontational hard bargaining to eliminate 
traditional union protections and undermine union power, with "fostering," or bargaining 
emphasizing cooperation and consensus). 
182. See Yanarella & Green, supra note 9, at 57, 71; Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 185, 
187, 191-92. 
183. Cf. Humphrey, supra note 53, at 98. The Japanese transplant strategy often used in the 
UK is to recognize a union, "but it is carefully selected for its acceptance of company goals, and its 
representation is severely circumscribed by ... agreement." Humphrey, supra note 53, at 98. 
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production and workforce organization methods puts a strain on their 
institutions and expectations. 
NUMMI should not be mistaken for more expansive models of 
worker participation, such as those presented by Volvo and Satum.184 
NUMMI adheres to rather traditional norms in completely separating 
labor from management regarding both the composition of its Board of 
Directors and the union's or workers' role in traditional managerial 
decisions such as product choice, marketing strategies, and hiring 
decisions.185 Nevertheless, NUMMI is far more open to input and 
more forthcoming with advance information and consultation, than the 
traditional American employer. Professors Adler and Cole have aptly 
coined the phrase "democratic Taylorism" to epitomize the NUMMI 
model.186 
Nor should NUMMI be mistaken for worker participation schemes 
which permit workers greater freedom in the actual performance of their 
tasks.187 NUMMI permits workers much more input into the design of 
the details of their jobs than would a traditionally organized automobile 
manufacturing plant. Nevertheless, once the design is established in the 
form of "standardized work," the employee must rigorously adhere to it, 
absent safety hazard or mistake.188 Thus, this system is distinguishable 
from those where workers have reorganized the work into a more craft-
like production system, or into one permitting greater individual 
variation. In particular, the demands of mass, albeit somewhat custom-
ized, production may encourage a different approach in the automobile 
184. For a description of labor relations and production methods at Saturn, see Katz & 
MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 209-10; Yanarella & Green, supra note 9, at 60-66; Filipczak, supra 
note 32, at 29-30, 32. Governance aspects of the now-closed Volvo Uddevalla plant are discussed 
in Adler, supra note 4, at 90; Berggren, supra note 168, at 37, 40-41, 44; Rehder & Finston, supra 
note 84, at 19-20. 
185. See, e.g., Quesada Presentation, supra note 1. 
186. Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 89. 
187. The literature discussing the now-defunct Volvo plant at Uddevalla provides the most 
extensive description of a "neo-craft'' approach to automobile manufacturing. See generally Rehder 
& Finston, supra note 84, at 18-21. The developing German model falls into yet a third category. 
Turner, supra note 2, at 220-32. Volkswagen has worker representation on its corporate supervisory 
board where the employees have input but no formal control over matters such as product choice 
and marketing strategies. Nevertheless, VW workers have works council-based input and partial co-
determiqation rights regarding the institution and functioning of new teamwork experiments. Their 
work is organized with longer cycle times, permitting more freedom to workers than at NUMMI, 
but far less than would be the case in a ''neo-craft", Volvo-like environment. 
188. See Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 86, 89; Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 46; Berggren, 
supra note 168, at 41. 
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industry than might be feasible in other fields. 189 
At bottom, NUMMI provides one, lawful, highly successful model 
for operating a high productivity, high quality manufacturing plant with 
a unionized workforce, in a participatory system. Under current U.S. 
labor law, a wide range of possible models are available. Experimenta-
tion is particularly desirable in a period when manufacturing and 
information processes are themselves in an extreme state of flux. 
VII. LEGAL OBSERVATIONS 
One set of pertinent legal questions relate to the present lawfulness 
of the NUMMI labor relations system, and whether comparable systems 
are protected, prohibited, encouraged, or discouraged by existing labor 
law. A second set of questions inquires whether advantages or disadvan-
tages of this type of production and labor relations system support legal 
changes to protect, prohibit, or encourage adoption of various aspects of 
this model. How can we encourage broad dissemination of this model, 
do we want to, and under what conditions? 
To a very large extent, one must conclude, the success at NUMMI 
depends upon the cooperative attitudes and personal support of both 
management and the workforce, throughout all levels of the firm. Law 
can mandate structures with some success, processes with less success, 
corporate culture only indirectly and tenuously through the first two. 
To the extent legally required or encouraged structures facilitate the 
inception or maintenance of high productivity, cooperative labor-
management relationships, the goal of improving North American global 
competitiveness could justify appropriate legal policy changes. However, 
disadvantages in modifying the status quo, upsetting existing expecta-
tions, institutional arrangements, and the balance of power between labor 
and management, demand great caution, as well as thoughtfulness and 
189. Professors Adler and Cole contend that for automotive and other "labor-intensive volume 
production," the NUMMI model is more efficient and appropriate than more flexible forms of 
production exemplified in the Volvo Uddevalla plant. Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 49. They 
reason that because of''the high ratio of routine to non[-]routine tasks ... in auto assembly, ... the 
sacrifice of efficiency and conformance [entailed in Volvo-style production is unlikely to be] worth 
the gains in flexibility." Adler & Cole, supra note 150, at 48. They believe that NUMMI is the 
more effective model for encouraging organizational learning because the standardized work process 
greatly facilitates both incremental innovation and diffusion of the results throughout the plant. "The 
NUMMI model thus assumes a higher growth rate for productivity and manufacturing quality." 
Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 86. They hold open the possibility, however, that in operations 
involving higher variety production, Volvo-like neo-craft models might prove superior. Adler & 
Cole, supra note 4, at 46, 48. 
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attention to detail in analyzing the impact on the labor relations system 
as a whole of even seemingly minor modifications. 
A. Lawfulness of the NUMMI Model 
In accord with most other commentators, save for a few doubts 
about some minor details, I regard the system in operation at NUMMI 
as lawful, neither protected nor prohibited by law in its broad design. 
However, several legal issues take on quite a different appearance if one 
assumes, instead of a strong, independent union such as the UAW, a 
weak or unaffiliated union, or no union at all. 
The key features of the NUMMI model for purposes of this 
examination include team-based work organization and worker participa-
tion, union-management joint committees, round tables and other forums, 
advance negotiation and pre-implementation settlement throughout mid-
term of the labor agreement of most operational, non-individual worker-
oriented issues, mixed cooperative and confrontational roles assigned to 
shop floor representatives, and health and safety problems stemming 
from lean production. In legal terms, three clusters of issues are raised: 
(1) National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"Y90 questions, centering on 
employer domination, support, or interference with a labor organization 
in violation of section 8(a)(2)191, as well as exclusivity of representa-
tion under section 9(a);192 (2) duty of fair representation problems; and 
(3) occupational safety and health, workers' compensation, tort and 
disability-related discrimination issues. The nature of the inquiry in the 
first two legal areas depends on the presence and nature of unionization 
at the plant, and therefore will be examined under alternative assumptions 
as to unionization, followed by consideration of safety and disability 
problems. 
1. Section 8(a)(2) and Other NLRA Issues in the Union Case 
When a NUMMI-like model is agreed upon between management 
and a strong, independent union, one may raise technical questions of 
compliance with the NLRA, but the doctrine can be shaped to accommo-
date NUMMI-type structures without undue strain, provided the 
employer, like NUMMI, is indeed acting cooperatively with the union, 
190. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). 
191. /d.§ 158(a)(2). 
192. /d. § 159(a). 
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and not simultaneously seeking to undermine it. 
Each of the multiple organs of union and employee participation 
structures can be questioned as involving employer dominated labor 
organizations under section 8(a)(2), and invasions of the union's 
exclusive representation franchise under section 9(a), hence in violation 
of section 8(a)(5). 
Many of these questions, however, appear more theoretical than 
actual. Where the union is clearly independent of the employer's 
organization, and the union and employer, in arms' length negotiations, 
enter into a substantial collective bargaining agreement, one can 
characterize worker participation in the various labor-management 
structures as either involving representatives of the union, or as bodies 
whose employee members are acting with authority delegated to them by 
the union. So long as the union, rather than management, selects or 
elects members to the committee, even a mutually agreed upon charter 
of activities and procedures for a joint body should not vitiate the fact 
that the union remains free to withdraw from the arrangement in the 
future. Mutual, good faith negotiation of such arrangements should not 
constitute illegal domination of or interference with the resulting "labor 
organization." There can be no "mistaken belief that [an organization] 
is truly representative and afford[s] an agency for collective bargain-
ing"193 when the belief is not mistaken.194 
Alternatively, insofar as bodies such as employee teams make 
decisions addressing employee "grievances" on behalf of only their own 
members, they fall within the proviso to section 9(a) permitting 
individual or group adjustment of grievances, provided the outcome is 
not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 
The union is either present, if these bodies are regarded as falling within 
the structure of the local union as well as the company, or the union has 
waived its entitlement to be present by contractually passing through to 
the employee body entitlement to represent itself.195 
193. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968). 
194. The relaxation of any of these constraints, however, present more doubtful cases which are 
addressed below. 
195. See Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 
332, 339 (1944). It may be that work teams in any event fall outside the strictures of section 8(a)(2) 
on grounds that they are not "labor organizations" within the meaning of section 2(5) of the Act, 
either because they are not "representative," since they reach decisions affecting only their own 
group, or because in the aggregate, all bargaining unit employees participate in the teams, or because 
the team decision making is autonomous. This argument shapes up somewhat differently, depending 
on the details of how the teams function, and whether either the team leader is construed to be a 
supervisor, or if the group leader, who clearly is supervisory, participates in the decision making. 
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At bottom, contentions that the NLRA flatly prohibits NUMMI-style 
labor-management cooperation with an independent union are based upon 
two points: the NUMMI model eliminates the open battle, and where 
successful, even the covert struggle, for control over the shop floor. 196 
Simultaneously, it encourages management to buy, and workers to sell, 
their mental as well as physical labor, rather than to retain the traditional 
division between management and workers.197 The contention is often 
made that both of these changes are at odds with basic assumptions 
embedded in the NLRA. Even assuming that the framers of the Wagner 
Act premised its design upon these assumptions, and that they were not 
modified in the enactment of Taft-Hartley, 198 the language and structure 
of the NLRA as a whole appear flexible enough to readily absorb the 
structural design of a NUMMI-type labor-management relationship. 
The limit on how far a union can proceed in this direction is better 
set through the broad policies shaping the duty of fair representation, 
rather than through parsing the language of sections 2(5), 8(a)(2), 
8(b)(l)(A), and 8(b)(2). A neat solution as to the employer might 
involve construing section 8(a)(2) to define unlawful employer domina-
tion in this setting as co-terminous with employer insistence upon union 
acceptance of an arrangement violative of the union's duty of fair 
representation. This equates reasonably well with the injunction that the 
employer not place itself "on both sides of the bargaining table."199 In 
any event, an employer bargaining demand which requires the union to 
breach its duty, would violate the employer's duty to bargain in good 
faith under section 8(a)(5), as a demand for agreement to an illegal 
contract term. 
These two arguments, together with the argument that the subjects considered in the teams fall 
outside the coverage of section 2(5), taking them outside the scope of section 8(a)(2), will be 
addressed in the non-union context infra. 
196. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 680-81, 684. 
197. See, e.g., Barry Wilkinson & Nick Oliver, Power, Control, and the Kanban, 26 J. OF 
MGMT. STUD. 47 (Jan. 1989). 
198. This point is, of course, the subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The 
Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. 
REv. 1381 (1993); Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition: 
The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1994); Karl 
E. Klare, The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39 (1988). 
199. NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Metal Prods. Co., 287 F.2d 790,791 (6th Cir. 1961). 
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2. The Union's Duty of Fair Representation 
The union owes all employees in the bargaining unit it represents 
a duty of fair representation. This duty requires it to avoid conduct as 
to any of its members that is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad 
faith."200 The union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the 
factual and legal circumstances at the time of the union's actions, the 
union's behavior is "so far outside a 'wide range of 
reasonableness' ... that it is wholly 'irrational' .... "201 The union 
must also at all times represent the interests of its members "in complete 
good faith and honesty of purpose," like a fiduciary, wholly loyal to the 
interests of the bargaining unit members alone.202 
Three sets of fair representation issues result from the NUMJv.li 
model. The first set involve claims that particular participatory structures 
of the NUMJv.li model entail union breaches of the duty. The second set 
parallel the first, but involve claims that the participatory structures will 
greatly increase the incidence of violations, even if they don't compel 
them. The third set relate to the values embodied in the NUMJv.li 
system, rather than the structures. 
The first category includes claims that joint union-management 
committees, advance negotiation and resolution of potential disputes, and 
the mixed cooperative and confrontational roles of shop floor union 
representatives blur the distinction between the interests and identity of 
union and employer. The contention is that the union's role is disrupted 
to so great an extent as to preclude compliance by the union with its duty 
of undivided loyalty and service to the interests of the bargaining unit. 
The weaker version of these claims, the second category, asserts that 
200. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). 
201. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 77 (1991), (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. 
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)). 
202. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). The exclusive bargaining agent 
is to act for and not against those whom it represents. It is a principle of general 
application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the 
assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and 
that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for 
whom it is exercised unless so expressed. 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192,202 (1944); see Humphrey v. Moore, 375 
U.S. 335, 342 (1964); see also O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 74. Section 501(a) of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act also imposes fiduciary obligations upon "officers, agents, shop 
stewards and other representatives of a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988 & Supp. 
v. 1994). 
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each of these structural arrangements multiplies the probabilities of union 
breaches of duty, and either taken separately or cumulatively, so reduces 
prospects for compliance that the structures should be themselves held to 
violate the duty. 
As to joint committees and advance resolution of disputes, these 
claims seem ill-founded. Advance negotiation of potential disputes in 
place of unilateral implementation by the employer followed by a 
protesting union grievance seems well within the "wide range of 
reasonableness"203 afforded a union in representing employees. Plainly, 
however, the union must act wholeheartedly in the interests of the 
employees, and consider the employer's interests only as a means to that 
end.204 However, courts and the National Labor Relations Board, when 
confronting duty of fair representation claims arising in the "living 
agreement'' context might do well to carefully scrutinize the union's 
performance. 
The third point, the mixed collaborative and confrontational roles 
assigned to shop floor representatives, poses somewhat greater danger of 
confusion for both members and union representatives alike. Clarifica-
tion and differentiation of the settings in which shop floor representatives 
play a cooperative ·as opposed to an adversarial role would greatly reduce 
the legal and practical problems with this aspect of NUMMI's structural 
configuration. Even better would be a division of labor eliminating the 
overlap of inconsistent roles and functions. Internal union political 
pressures appear to be inducing change along these lines in several local 
unions in the automobile industry. 
The core set of objections to the NUMMI model arise in reaction to 
its unified teamwork-based philosophy. The traditional U.S. industrial 
relations model relies on external, or primary controls to ensure that 
workers' performance conforms to the employer's needs. External 
controls include layers of supervision, rigidly structured jobs, and 
detailed worksite rules. The Japanese model, on the other hand, relies 
on indirect, or secondary controls, including both individual identification 
with internalized loyalty to both work-team and company, and consensus 
decisionmaking to ensure that having participated in reaching the 
decision, employees will identify with it and feel bound by it.205 
This system also is intrinsically opposite to the traditional U.S. 
system in its handling of recognition of competing interests. The U.S. 
203. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338. 
204. See, e.g., id. at 338-39; Steele, 323 U.S. at 202-03. 
205. See Young, supra note 47, at 684; Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8, 17. 
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system emphasizes the discrete interests of workers and their collective 
representative, the union, on the one side, and management on the other, 
and highlights individual and collective autonomy. It plays down the 
shared interests of labor and management. The Japanese model, on the 
other hand, highlights common interests of workers and company and 
deemphasizes to the point of attempted obliteration, the continued 
existence of disparate needs and concerns. 
While the U.S. system does not require extreme adversarialness, it 
is predicated on a healthy independence and arms-length dealing between 
union and employer. The duty of fair representation,206 as well as 
Board doctrines about disqualification of union representatives for 
conflict of interest,207 and employer domination under sections 2(5) and 
8(a)(2), presuppose a degree of independence of identity and action 
between union and employer that coexists uneasily with teamwork 
systems premised on a partnership relationship that approaches the 
familial. 
This dissonance in underlying culture and values manifests itself in 
operational terms in two, closely-connected fears, both implicating the 
union's ability to fulfill its duty of fair representation. First, cooperation 
may mean greater integration of the union and employees into managerial 
decisionmaking processes, a partial form of shared governance of the 
enterprise. The concern is that this entails the reverse - that manage-
ment will insinuate itself structurally, formally or informally, into the 
union's decisionmaking processes, impairing the union's ability to 
represent employees as an autonomous actor. Second, psychologically, 
union and team leaders may lose their exclusive or even primary loyalty 
to the rank and file when they become too closely integrated into 
management's decisionmaking structures, thereby depriving employees 
of the independent voice to which they are entitled. 
As to the first, there is no inextricable logic intertwining union and 
worker participation in enterprise governance with the reverse, manageri-
al participation in union governance. The exclusion of workers and 
unions from participation in managerial decisionmaking is a function of 
the scope of bargaining under the NLRA, together with state corporate 
and property law traditions.2°8 The union's exclusion is not legally 
206. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 
(1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
207. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555, 1557 (1954). 
208. Karl Klare made this point, in a slightly different context. Karl E. Klare, Workplace 
Democracy &Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 49-50 
(1989). 
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mandatory, but at the employer's option. 
As to management intervention in internal union processes, on the 
other hand, the duty of fair representation, NLRA doctrine regarding 
disqualification of a union as a "labor organization" on the basis of 
structural conflict of interest/09 the categorization of internal union 
affairs as a permissive subject of bargaining,210 sections 8(a)(l) and (2) 
of the NLRA, and the policies of internal union democracy embodied in 
the Labor- Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LRMDA"),211 
all militate to the contrary. Unions may participate with management in 
corporate joint structures, but should be required to preserve separate, 
core internal structures operating devoid of managerial presence and 
participation. Assuming they do so, existing duties of fair representation 
and fiduciary obligation, if complied with, are sufficient guarantee of 
union independence. A structure which would formally compromise that 
independence should be held to be unlawful. There remains a risk that 
a weak union may succumb to cooptative, "cooperative" enticements, but 
that is true even in more traditionally structured workplaces. 
The more difficult problem is the question of psychological 
dependence following from interdependence. The empirical evidence on 
this point is mixed. The most meaningful check on managerial 
cooptation of the union leadership plainly is not the duty of fair 
representation or other NLRA-based legal obligations. Rather, it is the 
presence of strongly democratic internal union norms and structures, 
bolstered by the requirements of the L:MR.DA. In several instances 
where the workers have felt that their leaders have "sold them out" or 
become "too cozy with management" as part of participatory workplace 
arrangements, they have voted them out of office. 
The claim, however, is that the rank and file, as well as the 
leadership, is subverted from accurately perceiving its legitimate interests 
through ongoing participation and identification with the corporate 
"team" interests. In addition, cooptation of the union may lead to 
erosion of its internal democracy. Short of an absolute prohibition upon 
209. The NLRB will disqualifY a union where a conflict of interest between the roles of 
managerial and supervisory employees within the organization creates "an innate danger of abuse 
of the collective bargaining process at the expense of the unit employees." Anchorage Community 
Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. 575 (1976); see also Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1964). 
The union must come to the bargaining table "with the single minded purpose of protecting and 
advancing the interests of the employees who have selected it as their bargaining agent .••• " 
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. at 1559. 
210. NLRB v. Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
211. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). 
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cooperative arrangements, it is hard to see how this situation can be 
precluded through legal norms, as opposed to membership mobilization. 
More focused research, at the level of the firm or workplace, would be 
useful in assessing the degree of risk of subversion of union processes. 
Most likely, for unions as for nations, "eternal vigilance is the price of 
freedom." 
3. The Non-Union Case 
The non-union setting raises a host of legal and policy problems 
regarding all forms of employee involvement, many of which have 
already been exhaustively discussed elsewhere. The discussion here will 
be limited to a brief examination of issues arising in non-union plants 
adopting a NUNIMI-like model without a certified union on the premises. 
A unionized employer could, in theory, attempt to implement a NillviMI-
like system over the union's opposition. As a practical matter, organized 
resistance would render the system unworkable. As a legal matter, the 
employer would be subject to section 8(a)(2) allegations similar to those 
in the non-union case,212 as well as to claims that the employer violated 
the union's exclusivity of representation rights and, dependent on 
circumstances, claims of failing to bargain over a mandatory subject 
contrary to section 8(a)(5).213 
Some non-union companies have applied lean production together 
with team-based work organization without providing for employee 
participation at the functional or strategic levels; others have created joint 
worker-manager committees to provide employee input at either or both 
of these higher levels. The lawfulness of the NillviMI model in a non-
union environment is uncertain, and depends upon how thoroughly the 
employer adheres to elements of the mode1.214 
Electromation and its progeny set some parameters for legal analysis 
of these cases.m Section 8(a)(2) proscribes employer domination or 
interference with the formation or administration of a "labor organiza-
212. Compare, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993) and Vons Grocery 
Co., 320 N.L.R.B. No.5 (1995) with, e.g., E1ectromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 
35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994). 
213. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). 
214. No consideration will be given to an employer who attempts to institute NUMMI-Iike 
production models in order to establish his own, Japanese-style, company union. Traditional section 
8(a)(2) analysis of such cases provides the appropriate resolution. 
215. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 990. 
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tion."216 Section 2(5), in turn, broadly defines a "labor organization" 
as including "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee 
representation committee or plan," provided (1) employees participate in 
it, (2) it exists, at least in part, for the purpose of "dealing with 
employers," and (3) those dealings concern "grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."217 
Assuming an organization meets the section 2(5) definition, section 
8(a)(2) is intended to ensure that the "organization itself [is] independent 
of the employer-employee relationship"218 and is "entirely the agency 
of the workers."219 
Where joint committees are established at the employer's behest, to 
address functional issues, it seems almost unavoidable that issues of 
"grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, 
or conditions of work" will be discussed in a setting in which the 
employee members of the committee "deal with" members of manage-
ment.220 A pattern or practice of bilateral interaction between the 
management and employee members of the joint committees will satisfy 
the section 2(5) test for "dealing".221 The employer's establishment of 
the structures and processes of the committees, and the employer's ability 
to abolish them at will, then suffices to demonstrate employer "domina-
216. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). 'Contributing fmancial or other support to a labor organization is 
also proscribed in the statute. Id. Both the Board and courts routinely categorize minor secretarial 
and telephone support as de minimis, while including paid release time from work as falling within 
the proviso to section 8(a)(2), which permits employees ''to confer with [the employer] during 
working hours without loss of time or pay." !d. 
217. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 992. 
218. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 213 (1959). 
219. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 994 (quoting remarks of Senator Wagner). 
220. ld. at 1004. (Member Oviatt, concurring). Employee committees that "act together with 
[management for] the purpose of communicating, addressing, and solving problems in the workplace 
that do not implicate the matters identified in Section 2(5)." Id. However, constant improvement 
of quality and productivity, as constructed at NUMMI, entails consideration of subjects covered 
under section 2(5). Compare id. at 1005 (Member Raudabaugh, concurring) (reasoning that in most 
cases, quality and productivity committees have to address mandatory subjects of bargaining in the 
course of problem solving) with id. at 1003-04 (Member Oviatt, concurring) (suggesting that 
productivity committees do not meet to discuss mandatory subjects). See also, e.g., Reno Hilton 
Resorts Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (1995) (even if most topics addressed by quality action teams 
were lawful, section 8(a)(2) was violated by consideration of subjects contained in section 2(5) in 
more than isolated instances). 
221. Electromation, Inc., at 995 n.21, 997-98; E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 
894; Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (1995); Webcor Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1995); 
Electrornation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1161 {7th Cir. 1994). See also NLRB v. Cabot Carbon 
Co., 360 U.S. 203, 218 (1959). 
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tion" under 8(a)(2).222 
The essence of the Japanese model is the claim that participation 
"counts", that worker input is part of a consensus building 
decisionmaking process. These committees cannot be labelled mere 
"communication devices," if they are to perform properly within the 
overall teamwork concept. Moreover, the committees are generally 
representative but not autonomous, two other potential safe harbors.223 
The likely result is that joint committee structures coupled with Toyota-
like teamwork consensus building probably violate section 8(a)(2). The 
teams themselves, however, may evade claims of section 8(a)(2) 
violation, depending on several factors. 
The teams usually bilaterally "deal with" management. Their 
"constant improvement" or kaizen activities inextricably include matters 
such as job assignments and work duties, mandatory subjects of 
bargaining encompassed within section 2(5). Nevertheless, their status 
under section 8(a)(2) may be lawful. One important question is the 
extent to which the communication between teams or team leaders and 
management may fairly be characterized as "representational" in nature, 
whether inclusion of all employees in the teams makes them in effect a 
lawful committee of the whole, whether other structures exist providing 
representation for broader aggregations of employees vis a vis manage-
ment, and whether, in any event, representationality is required to 
establish a violation of section 8(a)(2).224 
The employer can avoid section 8(a)(2) problems in several other 
222. See, e.g., Electromation, 35 F.3d at 1170. In the author's opinion, the Seventh Circuit 
presented a more convincing argument than the one offered by Member Raudabaugh's concurring 
opinion in Electromation. The Court of Appeals rejected Member Raudabaugh's contention that the 
Taft-Hartley amendments expanded the range of employee free choice from having to decide 
between rival unions or no union at all,. to a broader set of choices among participatory 
representation structures. See id. at 1168-69. Where employers seek to adopt the package of 
NUMMI structures and culture, however, it would seem that the unilateral employer determination 
of the nature and scope of employee participation precludes an argument based on employee choice, 
in any event. See, e.g., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995); Webcor 
Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1995). 
223. See, e.g., General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234 (1977); Mercy-Mem. Hosp., 231 
N.L.R.B. 1108, 1121 (1977); John Ascuaga's Nuggett, 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 276 (1977). 
224. Compare, e.g., Electromation Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 997 (leaving the question of 
representationality unresolved) and Electrornation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d at 1158 (leaving open the 
question of representationality) with Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1007 n.13 (Member 
Raudabaugh, concurring) (stating that representationality is not an essential factor); with id. at 999-
1003 (Member Devaney, concurring) (stating that representationality is an element to consider) and 
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 n.6 (1993) (Member Oviatt, concurring) (stating 
that representationality is required) and NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(commenting that representationality is required). 
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ways, each of which, however, could severely impair the functioning of 
the NUMMI model. One method is to deprive the teams of meaningful 
input, limiting them to "brainstorming".225 However, this would cut to 
the quick of the NUMMI philosophy of consensus decision makin!f26 
and participation in decision making by all workers to be affected. 
Another choice would be for the employer to limit team discussions to 
problems of "quality, efficiency, or productivity," and prohibit touching 
upon matters such as job assignments, overtime, and other mandatory 
subjects of bargaining.227 To do this, however, employees would have 
to cease kaizen type activities, vitiating the point of the exercise. A final 
alternative is for non-union employers to fully empower the work teams, 
making them truly autonomous by treating their decisions as controlling, 
eliminating any requirement of consultation with or approval by 
management. Whether on grounds that the functions delegated to the 
teams are managerial, hence permissive bargaining subjects, or on 
grounds that the complete autonomy eliminates the element of "dealing 
with" management, such an approach would be consistent with section 
8(a)(2).228 However, few employers so enthusiastically proclaiming 
their interest in employee participation have embraced a solution which 
would shift power so far into the hands of ordinary workers. 229 
In his concurring opinions in Electromation and DuPont, Member 
Devaney articulated a test akin to full disclosure of conflict of interest, 
or the negation of potential misrepresentation regarding loyalties and 
duties of the committee. He would have exempted from section 2(5) on 
grounds of lack of "agency," an employee committee which is ''unam-
biguously established to serve as agent of the Employer," rather than 
"act[ing] as the agent or advocate of other employees." Member 
Raudabaugh's four-part test of domination under section 8(a)(2) included 
225. See, e.g., NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Medical Ctr., 36 F.3d I262, I27I-72 (4th Cir. 
I994) (distinguishing legal brainstorming and one-way communication sessions from bilateral 
"dealings" involving a pattern of proposals and responses); see also E./. duPont de Nemours & Co., 
3 I I N.L.R.B. at 894. 
226. Participating in the team process, under a "rule of consensus," not only provides statutory 
supervisors and managers with veto power, but it also ensures that the decision making process falls 
within the scope of"dealing." See E./. duPont de Nemours & Co., 3I I N.L.R.B. at 895. 
227. Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (I995). 
228. See General Foods Corp., 23I N.L.R.B. I232, I233, I235 (I977); Mercy-Mem. Hosp., 23I 
N.L.R.B. II08, II2I (I977); John Ascuaga's Nugget!, 230 N.L.R.B. 275, 276 (I977). 
229. Recent employer efforts to rely on this line of case have ended in failure for precisely this 
reason. See, e.g., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 3I7 N.L.R.B. at I I IO (grievance committee's 
"fmal authority" found insufficiently binding); Magan Medical Clinic, Inc., 3I4 N.L.R.B. I083 
(I994). 
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overlapping criteria, and could produce similar results in application. 
Employers instituting NUMIVII-like structures, however, will 
undercut the foundational culture of shared interests and mutual 
representation they seek to inculcate if they disavow any role for either 
joint committees or worker teams in kaizen or quality circles as acting 
for employee interests and declare them to be acting on the employer's 
behalf alone. Such candor would procure legal immunity at the price of 
precluding attainment of the desired mental and emotional investment by 
workers in the enterprise. In the end, Member Devaney acknowledged 
the reality underlying his position. If you watch what the companies do, 
and not what they say, "I find it difficult to conceive of a situation where 
the very existence of an employee committee depends on the will of the 
employer, that would not merit a finding that the employer dominated the 
committee."230 
There is also considerable evidence to suggest anti-union animus in 
both site selection and screening of new hires for many of the tn:insplant 
facilities.231 While the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals have ex-
pressed various views of the elements of a section 8(a)(2) charge, the 
presence of anti-union animus in conjunction with the institution and 
maintenance of alleged employer dominated labor organizations nearly 
always militates in favor of a finding of violation.232 
230. E./. duPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 901 (Member Devaney, concurring). 
231. See, e.g., Kenney & Florida, supra note 15, at 32. The authors stated, 
Transplant assemblers ... prefer to settle in rural areas, where unions are weak or 
nonexistent. • . . Honda managers explain that they wanted to be able to hire workers 
who had not picked up 'bad habits' in U.S. factories. . . . A top executive of another 
automotive transplant says his company picked its site because the community is union 
free and to avoid blacks. 
Kenney & Florida, supra note 15, at 32. Other commentators have argued, 
Many Japanese-owned auto firms in the United States have taken great precautions in 
deciding where to locate the plants. Typically, such plants are located in right to work 
or antiunion states and areas where unemployment is high. . . . [A] key recruiting 
strategy is to hire workers without any union experience because union experience 
hinders assimilation into the desired culture of the firm. 
Young, supra note 47, at 690; see also Miller & Winter, supra note 15, at 25 ("mainly interested 
in finding a hard-working, non-union work force of rural Americans to staff their assembly 
lines ... .''). Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., officials have frankly acknowledged their fear that 
unionization would interfere with their ''participatory" production system. "It has been my 
experience that the team concept is slowed down when you have to work through a third party, and 
that affects cost. ... The UA W is a political organization and very unpredictable." Marjorie A. 
Sorge & Douglass T. Davidoff, Union Fears & Poor Sales, 27 WARD'S AUTO WORLD 42 (Feb. 
1991 ). For a description of the failed union organizing efforts at transplant facilities, see Yanarella 
& Green, supra note 9, at 70-73. 
232. See, e.g., NLRB v. Newport News, Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251 
(1939); NLRB v. E1ectrornation, Inc., 35 F.3d 1148, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994); Electromation, 309 
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In addition, the deliberate siting and hiring, to systematically avoid 
unions, is a topic worthwhile for the NLRB to pursue, on its own merits, 
under sections 8(a)(l) and (3), were an appropriate unfair labor practice 
charge to be filed.233 If this were an employment discrimination case, 
it would be labelled a "pattern and practice" of violative activity.234 
B. Legal Doctrine Which Encourages Or Inhibits Employer Adoption 
of the NUMMI Model 
The NUMMI model is neither mandated nor prohibited by law in 
the unionized setting, but there are aspects of the NLRA which operate 
to discourage potential imitators which warrant consideration. Three 
overlapping facets of the NUMMI system are paradigmatic of flattened 
hierarchy, worker participation schemes: broad, generalized job 
classifications, self-managed teams, and bundling of indirect labor 
functions with production work.235 Management guru Tom Peters 
quotes NUMMI's formal guiding philosophy statement as including 
among its elements, "every employee as a manager."236 
The Supreme Court's expansive definitions of managerial and 
supervisory status operate to discourage unions from entering into 
agreements calling for broad assumption of participatory responsibilities. 
The rewriting of workers' job descriptions to push power downward in 
the hierarchy, risks transforming unionized employees into "non-
employees," i.e., managers or supervisors, with unprotected status and no 
right to unionize under the NLRA.237 Consider, for example, the 
N.L.R.B. 990, ·996-97 (1992) (proof of anti-union animus not required). But see id. at 1013 
(Member Raudabaugh, concurring) (arguing that anti-union animus is a factor). 
233. See David A. Tykulsker, For a Refonned Labor Law To Limit Plant Closings, 12 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 205 (1981). 
234. See generally Marley S. Weiss, Risky Business: Age and Race Discrimination in Capital 
Redeployment Decisions, 48 Mo. L. REv. 901 (1989). 
235. See, e.g., Nowlin, supra note 68, at 7. 
236. TOM PETERS, THRIVING ON CHAOS: HANDBOOK FOR A MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION 341 
(1988). 
237. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994) (excluding L.P.N.'s 
from bargaining unit, on grounds of supervisory status); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 672-
73 (1980) (holding that university faculty members possess managerial status, hence are excluded 
from inclusion in the bargaining unit); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,274-77 (1974) 
(same as to buyers' agents). But see, e.g., Anamag, 284 N.L.R.B. 621 (1987) (finding that 
autonomous work teams operating within a lean production/worker participation production system 
were neither supervisory nor managerial, despite team collective exercise of supervisory functions 
such as discipline, job and overtime assignments and performance appraisal). In Health Care 
Retirement Corp., the Court used a textually-based statutory interpretation of section 2(11) of the 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), to strike down the NLRB's longstanding distinction between 
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description of the team leaders' job at USX's Gary, Indiana facility. 
This position "effectively assigns supervisory responsibility and authority 
in all areas except discipline to a production or maintenance work-
er."238 For workers excluded from the NLRA definition of "employ-
ee," continued representation by the union is permissible, but should the 
cooperative relationship turn adversarial, the employer would have the 
distinct advantage of a defensible legal position in refusing to recognize 
the union as the bargaining agent for non-statutory employees.239 The 
self-determination, separate bargaining unit entitlement of professional 
employees240 also becomes problematic when heretofore "professional" 
work is integrated into production worker job descriptions. 
The three year contract bar rule,241 similarly, operates to discour-
age all but the most self-confident unions from entering into long-term 
cooperation agreements, which frequently exceed three years/42 thereby 
opening the union up to the risk of decertification or a rival union 
challenge during the additional term of the agreement. The mandatory-
permissive bargaining subject distinction243 provides further 
disincentive for unions to enter such agreements, while psychologically 
dissuading employers. The union which includes promises on such 
managerial type duties that are "incidental to" or "in addition to" workers' jobs and duties of those 
"supervisory" workers whose major responsibilities involve the directing of others. Health Care & 
Retirement Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 1782-83. The Court was forced to consider a longstanding problem-
that Congress clearly intended professionals to be protected by the NLRA while excluding supervi-
sors from coverage as employees. As Justice Ginsberg pointed out in dissent, the Court's decision 
is likely to substantially reduce the number of professionals who are covered by the Act. Id. at 
1791-92 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). A broad reading of the Health Care Retirement Corp. decision 
could support the exclusion from employee status and union representation of all employees who 
acquire any managerial-type skills or exercise independent judgment or discretion through team-
based practices. 
238. Jeffrey B. Arthur, The Transformation of Industrial Relations in the American Steel 
Industry, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECf!VE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 529, 534 (Paula B. 
Voos ed., 1994). 
239. Many employers have already implemented job redefinition strategies to include a sufficient 
number of supervisory or managerial tasks in rank and file workers' jobs to label them non-union 
bargaining units as a union-avoidance or minimization device. See Voos, supra note 143, at 12; 
Jeffrey Keefe & Karen Boroff, Telecommunications Labor-Management Relations after Divestiture, 
in CONTEMPORARY COLLECf!VE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 303, 331 (Paula B. Voos ed., 
1994) (CWA suffering bargaining unit erosion via creeping transformation of unit job titles at the 
upper boundary into managerial and supervisory positions). 
240. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b); see generally Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937). 
241. See American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 254 (1953). 
242. Cf. Cutcher-Gershenfeld & McHugh, supra note 90, at 248 (discussing reasons for unions 
to enter into a longer-term contract with auto parts suppliers in a cooperative labor-management 
relationship). 
243. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958). 
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matters in a collective bargaining agreement may find only arbitral 
remedies, rather than an NLRB bad faith bargaining charge possible, 
should the employer have a change of heart.244 The employer, on the 
other hand, is encouraged to breach such promises, and also is psycho-
logically dissuaded from entering into such commitments in the :first 
place, since the legal regime has so sharply defined certain territory as 
within the employer's prerogatives. Each of these doctrines warrants 
reexamination, legislatively if necessary, if government seriously wants 
to foster dissemination of NUMMI-like production and wor* processes 
by mutual agreement between employers and labor unions. 
Given the importance of sharing information to successful imple-
mentation of labor-management partnerships, expanding the types of 
information to which the union is mandatorily entitled under the NLRA, 
either by NLRB re-interpretation of the Act or by amendment is likewise 
worth considering. 
C. Health, Safety, Disability and Privacy Problems 
The lean production method raises grave doubts about its adaptabili-
ty to accommodate workers with disabilities, particularly if job rotation 
is mandatory. Lean production also raises questions about the feasibility 
of externally regulating job health and safety under conditions of 
constantly improving and changing work practices. The sharpest 
criticisms ofNUMMI and similar models of lean production and worker 
participation related to the impact on employees' health and safety of 
prolonged periods of work at the verge of maximum effort exertion under 
the stress of internalized demands for near perfection in quantity and 
quality of work. 
Given the faster pace and intensified nature of the work, job safety 
problems are extremely worrisome. High incidence of repetitive motion 
injury has been reported at the Mazda, Nissan, and Suburu-Isuzu 
transplant operations/45 as well as at Japanese automobile plants in 
Japan,246 although the NUMMI-style, frequent job rotation approach 
works as at least a partial prophylactic measure against such problems. 
Adverse long term consequences of intensified work practices are 
particularly difficult to predict and protect against at this stage. 
244. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 
164-65 (1971). 
245. Kenney & Florida, supra note 15, at 31. 
246. See Young, supra note 47, at 686. 
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Job rotation thus poses an internally contradictory set of policy 
problems. Workers need to rotate to minimize risk of future injury, but 
those already partially disabled often find mandatory rotation an obstacle 
to employment. For them, reasonable accommodation requires limited 
or no rotation. In a team-based work environment, these two needs are 
difficult to reconcile. 
Several factors contribute to workers in many lean production plants 
working at or beyond a healthily sustainable pace. First, and most 
important, is the sheer speed of the production process, at NUM:MI 
collectively determined by the work teams through the standardized work 
process, and then programmed into the kanban cards which control the 
automated aspects of the system, as well as instructing workers on the 
timing they must observe. Many Japanese-owned companies operating 
in the U.S., for example, have increased the work pace far beyond that 
customary in U.S. manufacturing facilities.247 This is simply the flip 
side of their famed increased productivity. 
To the extent that pace is at the heart of the problem, one might 
think it could be decoupled from the rest of the system248 by some 
form of external norm setting. Standards in theory could be enforceable 
by OSHA or state counterpart regulatory agencies, or by internal norms, 
set either through labor-management relations or by benevolent manage-
ment, honestly invested in the long-term well-being of employees, as 
well as in minimizing workers' compensation and other fringe benefit 
costs. 
However, in worker team-controlled systems, either management 
pressures or shared commitment of workers may lead to such enthusiastic 
worker "buy-in" to company goals that they themselves set standards too 
high. Some commentators view team-based lean production as the 
vehicle par excellence for organizational learning, productivity growth 
and quality improvement in high volume, relatively standardized 
production.249 Even enthusiasts concede, however, that the model may 
be difficult to sustain without dehumanizing workers, absent vigorous, 
democratic, independent union representation.250 Harsher critics say 
that the teams constitute a "highly threatening form of social manipula-
tion and intimidation,"251 and contend that the price of productivity 
247. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 686-88. 
248. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 688 (arguing that ''the JIT [just-in-time] system becomes 
confounded with the pace-of-work issue."). 
249. See, e.g., Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 85. 
250. See, e.g., Adler & Cole, supra note 4, at 86. 
251. Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8. 
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improvements is an inhuman workpace that results in high injury and 
high turnover rates.252 
On the other hand, some observers have attributed high levels of 
stress to the just-in-time system, independent of the overall pace of the 
work. The low levels of inventory are contended to require workers to 
perform their subassembly work perfectly and on time, every time, an 
internalized standard reinforced by their own team's and subsequent 
teams' dependence upon them. This is said continuously to cause a 
small crisis in workers' minds, improving their concentration and work 
discipline, hence productivity, but without prospect of any slack or relief 
except during formal break-times; it likewise maximizes their stress.253 
Only scrapping or outlawing just-in-time assembly could fully obviate 
this problem, and given the just-in-time process' link to higher productiv-
ity and profitability levels, this possibility is extremely remote. 
A related factor exacerbates the problem. At NUM:MI and most 
lean production, teamwork-based facilities, no relief workers are 
available, apart from the team leader. Together with the speed of the 
line, this factor has resulted in the average auto transplant factory worker 
working over fifty-six minutes per hour, compared to thirty-four to forty 
at General Motors.254 Together with strict absenteeism rules, this 
induces greatly improved attendance and productivity, but at a steep price 
to the workers' emotional life and sometimes to their health and family 
commitments. Nonetheless, it is difficult to envision the appropriate 
form for an externally set health and safety regulation; this seems to be 
a classic workplace problem where localized norm-setting between union 
and employer makes the most sense. 
At its best, teamwork implies a benevolent, mutual gain-sharing type 
of win-win investment by management in labor and vice versa. The 
NUM:MI model in many respects seems to come close to matching its 
ideals. Internalized control, peer pressure, and broader social control 
function in this model as superior, and far more flexible methods of 
motivation than watchdog, drive-type supervision in command and 
control models. The line between such supportive benevolence and 
police state tactics, however, can be very thin. Certain automotive 
transplant companies have allegedly enforced their expectations that 
workers remain selflessly devoted to their employer and refrain from 
criticizing it, through methods of intimidation, surveillance, and 
252. Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8; Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 195. 
253. See Young, supra note 47, at 685-86. 
254. Rehder & Finston, supra note 84, at 8. 
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disciplinary reprisal.255 External regulation here, too, appears to have 
proven ineffective. 
D. Broader Legal Policy Questions 
NUMMI, as well as many other companies, but particularly 
Japanese transplants, have moved toward "boundaryless" relations with 
their suppliers.256 This raises two, separate issues. First, the existing 
sharp demarcation between employer-employee relations and worker 
issues involving independent contractors should be reexamined. The 
distinction will increasingly fail to accurately portray reality, and the 
arbitrary ending of legal responsibility at the corporate boundary will 
prove destructive of worker workplace rights of all types. 
Second, the idea of job security is widely accepted as integral to 
successful worker participation systems of all types,257 for reasons aptly 
illustrated by Martha Quesada's presentation at LaJolla. Integral to job 
security promises of original equipment manufacturers such as NUMMI, 
is their reliance upon suppliers and contractors and temporary and 
contingent workers to serve as the reserve labor pool buffer, making it 
possible to fulfill the company's job security commitments.258 
This strongly suggests that it is fallacious to believe our countries 
can move down the road toward high productivity, secure employment 
relationships for everyone. Rather, such a strategy is one of deliberately 
creating two, three or even four tiers within the workforce, much as 
exists in Japan.259 In such a pyramid system, only workers employed 
in the top tier businesses are reasonably secure in continuous employ-
ment. In light of the history of the lower tiers in such stratified systems 
being disproportionately. occupied by minorities and women, this is of 
particular concern. 
Moreover, if job security is a prerequisite to meaningful worker 
participation schemes, absent imposition of either job security or worker 
participation obligations by law, it is predictable that the great majority 
of employees will be working without benefit of either, since they will 
be outside the "primary'' employment sphere. Overall labor policy, then, 
should not be predicated on the mirage that either labor-management 
255. Kenney & Florida, supra note 15, at 31-32. 
256. See Katz & MacDuffie, supra note 37, at 192. 
257. See, e.g., Young, supra note 47, at 685. 
258. See, e.g., Cutcher-Gershenfeld & McHugh, supra note 90, at 252-53. 
259. See Cutcher-Gershenfeld & McHugh, supra note 90, at 252-53. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Hofstra Lab. L. J. 490 1995-1996
490 Hofstra Labor Law Journal [Vol. 13:2 
cooperation or job security will become the dominant approach to labor-
management relations in the manufacturing sector, absent much broader 
changes in U.S. labor law. 
Alternatively, one could suggest legally mandating far stronger job 
security measures than presently exist, including both protections against 
employment termination without just cause, and limitations on mass 
layoffs and reductions in force. Apart from broader considerations of 
labor policy and equity, such increased worker protections could be 
justified on grounds that their mandatory existence will increase the 
probability of adoption and the likely success rate of high productivity, 
team work-based work organization systems.260 In addition, by elimi-
nating the possibility of competing on the basis of more traditional, 
worker coercion/fear of discharge premises, legally mandating job 
security would further encourage adoption of teamwork and cooperation-
oriented processes. 
If employee job security is the quid pro quo for meaningful 
employee participation, union job security is probably the quid pro quo 
for cooperative labor-management relations. "Win-win" bargaining 
plainly requires mutual trust, and the absence of concern that the other 
side is attempting to eliminate or undermine its bargaining partner. 
In addition, studies suggest that the key factors maximizing success 
in worker participation programs are themselves heavily correlated with 
union representation. Programs in organized workplaces "tend to be 
more and extensive than nonunion efforts, to result in more productivity 
improvement and to last longer."261 NLRA changes which would 
increase the security of the union's status as the exclusive bargaining 
agent, increase the ease of gaining recognition, and close the many legal 
and illegal vehicles for deunionization and union avoidance, would thus 
increase the prospects for voluntary adoption of more cooperative, highly 
productive forms of labor relations. 
At bottom, the less bureaucratized, less legalized, less rule bound 
system so productive at NUMMI depends upon mutual trust in the long-
term relationship to produce shared interpretation of contract language; 
260. Some commentators have listed four criteria which they argue increase significantly the 
probability that a worker participation program will produce higher productivity. Two of the criteria 
are protection against unjust dismissal and long-term employment guarantees. David I. Levine & 
Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, & the Firm's Environment, in PAYING FOR 
PRODUCTIVITY: A LOoK AT THE EVIDENCE (Alan L. Blinder ed., 1990), discussed in Mishel & 
Voos, Unions and American Economic Competitiveness, in Unions and Economic Competitiveness 
1, 10 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992). 
261. Voos, supra note 143, at 6; accord Marshall, supra note 3, at 299-300. 
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no legislation in the world can assure this. Nor, as sometimes suggested, 
would decreased legal regulation contribute to this; rather, it would 
decrease the overall level of trust if frequent breaches of mutual 
understandings led to the undermining of any mutual trust. Repeal or 
amendment of section 8(a)(2) to permit employers to institute the 
functional equivalent of a student council would be ill-advised on 
practical, economic grounds as well as on the basis of worker interests 
in a modicum of dignity and democratic representation in the workplace. 
Moreover, in many industries and job classifications, more traditional 
forms of work organization may well prove to be the most productive. 
Reconstructing federal labor relations policy on the fallacious assumption 
that team-based work organization should or will be the norm across-the-
board might well prove to be a serious mistake, disadvantaging the U.S. 
in the globally competitive marketplace. 
In addition to legal changes, broader macro-economic policy 
changes could promote the development of high performance workplaces. 
Both labor law and economic policy should be used to minimize the 
availability and attractiveness of competition based on low wage, low 
direct labor cost, deunionization strategies, to encourage investment in 
human capital, and competition based on high wages and high productiv-
ity_262 
Finally, whether or not section 8(a)(2) prohibits most forms of true 
worker participation absent union representation, this writer would urge, 
legislatively if necessary, an absolute prohibition on implementation of 
lean production methods in non-union environments. The level of risk 
to worker health and safety, mental and physical, short and long term, in 
such high productivity environments, the impossibility of adequate 
governmental monitoring in an environment of constant improvement, 
hence constant change in the details of the production process, and the 
extreme pressure generated by the carrots of peer pressure and company 
loyalty, together with the sticks of fear of job loss, plant closure, or 
subcontracting of operations, is simply too great to counter with any sort 
of internal plant organization. Only an independent, trade union, whose 
existence is free of dependence on the employer, can adequately police 
these worker interests, even at the most minimal level. 
262. Voos, supra note 143, at 15, 18-19; Marshall, supra note 3, at 305-06. 
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